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GOVERNANCE
IN CHAPTER 11 REORGANIZATIONS:
REDUCING COSTS, IMPROVING RESULTS
EDWARD S. ADAMS*
Throughout the past two years, Trans World Airlines, Midway Airlines,
and R.H. Macy Company,1 as well as over 46,000 other corporations, 2 have
filed petitions for relief under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy
Code.3 Of the firms that have filed Chapter 11 reorganization petitions, over
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. I am indebted
and grateful to the following individuals for their comments: Steve Nickles, Daniel
Farber, Phillip Frickey, John Matheson, David Carlson, David Epstein, and Robert
Kressel. My thanks also to my research assistants: Thomas Lockner, Tom Osteraas, and
Stephen Kitzinger.
1 See, e.g., Bankrupt TWA Latest Victim: Airline is 6th in 2 Years to Seek Court Protec-
tion, ATLANTA J., Jan. 31, 1992, at Al; Martha M. Hamilton, Trans World Airlines Files
for Bankruptcy: Pact with Creditors, Union is Part of Action, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 1992,
at Cl; Carla Lazzareshi, R.H. Macy Files for Bankruptcy, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1992, at
Al; David Markiewicz, Midway Enters Bankruptcy and Obtains a Line of Credit, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 27, 1991, at DI; John Schmeltzer, Chapter 11for Macys: Heavy Debt, Reces-
sion Slow Giant Retailer's Parade, CH1. TRIB., Jan. 28, 1992, at Cl.
2 Telephone interview with Edward Flynn, Management Analyst in Bankruptcy Divi-
sion of the Administrative Office for the United States Courts (Feb. 25, 1993); see also
John Greenward, The Bankruptcy Game: Chapter 11, TIME, May 18, 1992, at 60 (pro-
claiming 21,000 Chapter 11 filings in 1991); Life After Chapter 11: For Six Big Survivors,
FORTUNE, Feb. 11, 1991, at 13 (proclaiming 20,500 Chapter 11 filings in 1990).
3 The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (Bankruptcy Code), 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Chapter 11 is the business rehabilitation chapter of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. Id. §§ 1101-1174. A debtor may file a voluntary petition for Chapter 11
pursuant to § 301. Id. § 301. Chapter 11 countenances the rehabilitation of a business
entity pursuant to a reorganization plan by which the entity remains in business, albeit
with a new ownership structure. In a Chapter 11 reorganization, the assets of the entity
are essentially sold to existing participants. That is, a "forced sale" occurs in which
creditors and investors sell their claims and receive in return a share of the reorganized
company. The shares are distributed according to the absolute priority rule. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129 (1988) (providing a set of requirements for plan approval).
In a Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding, by contrast, a firm relinquishes all of its assets to
the control of a trustee who sells the assets--either piecemeal or as a functioning unit-to
third parties and distributes the proceeds to the firm's residual claimants. Id. §§ 701-76
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992); see THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANK-
RUPTCY LAW 210-11 (1986) [hereinafter JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMITS] (stating that
both reorganization and liquidation are sales of an entity's assets: reorganization involves
a sale to existing claimants and liquidation a sale to third parties); Douglas G. Baird, The
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eighty percent will never reorganize successfully and will not avoid a subse-
quent conversion to a Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding.4 The effects of these
"misfilings" are enormous. Most fundamentally, an attempted reorganiza-
tion, when liquidation is the more efficient solution, can unnecessarily
increase the overall costs of bankruptcy significantly.
In response to these costs, some scholars have called for the repeal of
Chapter II,' while others have advocated merely a new approach to Chapter
11 reorganization proceedings.' Still others defend the present Chapter 11
system.7 This Article contends that reducing bankruptcy costs requires a
revised Chapter 11 reorganization structure. This Article posits a two-part
Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127, 127 n.1 (1986)
(arguing a reorganization is a "forced sale" whereby an "investor 'sells' his claim and
receives in return a share of the reorganized company"); Robert C. Clark, The Interdisci-
plinary Study of Legal Evolution, 90 YALE L.J. 1238, 1252-53 (1981) (describing reorgan-
ization as the purchase of an insolvent business by its creditors and comparing it with a
"true liquidation" under Chapter 7); Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy
Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857, 893-96 (1982) (comparing
liquidation to reorganization proceedings). The proceeds will be distributed according to
the priority of the claim; generally, administrative expenses will be paid first, followed by
secured claims. General creditors will then share pro rata. Any remaining proceeds will
be distributed to the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 726 (1988).
1 See, e.g., Susan Jensen-Conklin, Financial Reporting by Chapter 11 Debtors: An
Introduction to Statement of Position 90-7, 66 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 7 n.198 (1992) (finding
that only 10-12% of Chapter 11 cases involve successful reorganizations); Honorable Ste-
phen A. Stripp, Balancing of Interests in Orders Authorizing the Use of Cash Collateral in
Chapter 11, 21 SETON HALL L. REV. 562, 571 n.49 (1991) (noting a 10-15% success
rate).
A Chapter 11 reorganization proceeding can be converted into a Chapter 7 liquidation
proceeding by the debtor, 11 U.S.C. § 1112(a), or pursuant to a request by the United
States Trustee or a party in interest upon a showing of cause. Id. § 1112(b).
5 See JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMITS, supra note 3, at 223; Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy
and Risk Allocation, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 439, 489 (1992); Baird, supra note 3, at 128;
Lucian A. Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 HARv. L. REV.
775, 785 (1988); James W. Bowers, Groping and Coping in the Shadow of Murphy's Law:
Bankruptcy Theory and the Elementary Economics of Failure, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2097,
2141 (1990); Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter
11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043, 1049-50 (1992). But see Frank H. Easterbrook, Is Corporate
Bankruptcy Efficient?, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 411 (1990) (arguing that because Chapter 11
endures, it must be efficient); Lynn M. LoPucki, Strange Visions in a Strange World.: A
Reply to Professors Bradley and Rosenzweig, 91 MICH. L. REV. 79 (1992) (criticizing
market based solutions to bankruptcy reorganization); Elizabeth Warren, The Untenable
Case for Repeal of Chapter 11, 102 YALE L.J. 437 (1992) (critiquing Bradley and
Rosenzweig).
6 See, e.g., Christopher W. Frost, Running the Asylum: Governance Problems in Bank-
ruptcy Reorganizations, 34 ARIz. L. REV. 89 (1992) (advocating a financial economics
approach to Chapter 11 decision making).
I E.g., Warren, supra note 5, at 478.
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revision to the present Chapter 11 system: (1) replacing corporate managers
acting as debtors in possession' with trustees; and (2) establishing a method-
ology to guide these new decision makers in determining whether a reorgani-
zation or a liquidation is the proper course of action in a given case.
In articulating this proposal, Part I of this Article will explore the histori-
cal antecedents of the present Chapter 11. Specifically, Part I will survey the
common law roots of the corporate insolvency scheme, statutory antecedents
to the current Chapter 11, and the legislative history of the current Chapter
11.
Part II explores the role of debtors in possession with a particular empha-
sis on their three principal types of decisions: Business Activity Decisions,
Fundamental Bankruptcy Decisions, and Non-Polar Decisions. Moreover,
Part II explores the principal effects of the debtor in possession structure and
its accompanying separation of ownership and control.' In so doing, this
Article will emphasize three particular effects of this separation: (1) the often
conflicting duties that debtors in possession face; (2) agency costs; and (3)
heightened bankruptcy costs.'0 Part II concludes that heightened bank-
ruptcy costs are primarily the product of managers who act in their own self-
interest when making decisions as the debtor in possession.
Part III examines the effectiveness of the Bankruptcy Code's solution to
this separation of ownership and control. This critique will include detailed
criticisms of the present structure. Part III demonstrates the need for a new
solution because the Bankruptcy Code fails to constrain adequately debtor in
possession indiscretions with respect to Fundamental Bankruptcy Decisions.
Part IV offers a Proposed Chapter 11, a two-prong solution to reduce
bankruptcy costs in Chapter 11 reorganizations. The first prong advocates a
bifurcated debtor in possession structure whereby bankruptcy trustees make
Fundamental Bankruptcy Decisions and the entity's existing management
I A "debtor in possession" is the debtor (typically, the existing management of the
debtor) except in the rare instance when a trustee has been appointed. See I 1 U.S.C.
§ 1101.
I The separation of ownership and control that occurs in the corporate form has been
widely explored in the context of solvent corporations. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Unstable Coalitions: Corporate Governance As a Multi-Player Game, 78 GEO. L.J. 1495
(1990) (arguing that corporate governance cannot be viewed in bilateral terms); Eugene
F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON.
301, 302 (1983) (arguing that contractual structures of organizations separate monitoring
of decisions from implementation of decisions); Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Struc-
ture, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 306 (1976) (espousing a unified theory of the firm and its
relation to agency costs); John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Corporate Law and the
Longterm Shareholder Model of Corporate Governance, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1313 (1992)
(discussing shareholder influence on corporate governance).
" Bankruptcy costs consist of both direct costs, such as attorney's fees, and indirect
costs, such as choosing reorganization when liquidation is more efficient. See discussion
infra part II.C.3.
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makes Business Activity Decisions.' The second prong of the Proposed
Chapter 11 countenances the development of a methodology for guiding the
trustee in determining whether to proceed with the Chapter 11 reorganiza-
tion or to convert the proceeding to a Chapter 7 liquidation of the entity. In
developing this methodology, the two principal prevailing views of bank-
ruptcy theory will be considered: the economic account and the
noneconomic (or value-based) account.' 2 After rejecting both these accounts
as unsatisfactory, this Article suggests a process-based view that would
reduce bankruptcy costs in a manner consistent with the goals of Chapter
11. After discussing potential criticisms and limitations of this model, a
brief conclusion will follow.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHAPTER 11
A. Equity Receiverships
The United States Constitution gives Congress the authority to establish
"uniform laws on the subject of Bankruptcies."'" Congress exercised this
authority on a national level for the first time in 1800 with the enactment of
a five year interim statute, which was repealed after three years.' 4 In 1841,
Congress enacted a second bankruptcy statute that survived for only one
year.'5 In 1867, a third statute was promulgated, thrice amended, and then
repealed in 1878.16 Finally, Congress adopted the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,'7
which survived, with amendment, until 1978.
11 See infra part II.A for a discussion of debtor in possession decision making.
12 The economic account's principal proponents are Professor Douglas G. Baird and
Professor Thomas H. Jackson. See, e.g., JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMITS, supra note 3;
Baird, supra note 3. See generally Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate
Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests.- A Comment on Ade-
quate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 97 (1984)
(examining corporate reorganizations from an economic perspective). Principal propo-
nents of what I characterize as the noneconomic (or value-based) account include Profes-
sor Elizabeth Warren and Professor Donald Korobkin. See, e.g., Donald R. Korobkin,
Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of Bankruptcy, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 717 (1991)
(arguing that Baird's theory of bankruptcy is flawed); Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Pol-
icy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 812 (1987) (arguing that Baird's approach is incomplete).
13 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8. The Framers viewed constitutional authority for the crea-
tion of a federal bankruptcy law as essential to the promotion of interstate commerce.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 277-78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Notwithstanding the existence of this constitutional provision, the United States Supreme
Court in Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 213 (1827), held that the Bankruptcy
Clause did not bar state schemes absent preemptive federal legislation.
14 CHARLES WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 19 (1935) (detail-
ing the history of the first bankruptcy statute, the Bankrupt Act of 1800).
15 Id. at 79-85 (describing the brief history of the Bankrupt Act of August 19, 1841).
16 Id. at 105 (detailing the history of the Bankrupt Act of March 2, 1867). See gener-
ally EDWARD I. ALTMAN, CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY IN AMERICA (1971) (discussing
the history of bankruptcy law in the United States); PETER J. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND
[Vol. 73:581
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In the late nineteenth century, with bankruptcy law unsettled, 8 courts of
equity took the initiative and formulated a procedure that is the historical
antecedent to the present Chapter 11. Courts of equity responded to the
significant problems encountered by railroads prior to 1870.19 The insol-
vency of railroads posed grave and unique problems for the American econ-
omy and legal system. Railroads possessed enormous assets, rights of way
over narrow strips of land, and hundreds or even thousands of miles of iron
rails, yet these assets had little scrap value-what else could these assets be
used for if not a railroad? In addition, railroads provided vital services to
interstate commerce and local communities. Complicating the plight of
insolvent railroads was an ineffective legal system; federal legislation was in a
constant state of flux and limited state remedies proved inadequate because
railroad lines, unlike state jurisdiction, generally extended across several
states.20
Responding to this problem, courts of equity molded the concept of equity
receivership to solve the problem of railroad insolvency.2 ' In a traditional
receivership, creditors called upon a court of equity to appoint a receiver to
take control of a debtor's assets and sell them for the benefit of creditors.22
Once the court appointed a receiver, the debtor's property was under the
control of the receiver and thus was immune from process by another court,
including execution by contending claimants. 21 In the typical railroad scena-
CREDITORS IN AMERICA: INSOLVENCY, IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT, AND BANKRUPTCY
1607-1900, at 18 (1974) (same); Vern Countryman, A History of American Bankruptcy
Law, 81 COM. L.J. 226-32 (1971) (same); Lawrence Shepherd, Personal Failures and the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 27 J.L. & ECON. 419, 422 (1984) (same).
17 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, amended by Bankruptcy Act of 1933
(Bankruptcy Act), ch. 204, 47 Stat. 1467, repealed by Bankruptcy Code.
18 Until 1898, Congress failed to enact a satisfactory federal scheme, nor had the
majority of states promulgated effective insolvency legislation. See COLEMAN, supra note
16, at 273 (noting that "[o]nly half of the fourteen eastern states entered the twentieth
century with" viable insolvency schemes).
19 See generally Jeffrey Stern, Note, Failed Markets and Failed Solutions. The Unwit-
ting Formulation of the Corporate Reorganization on Technique, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 783
(1990) (tracing the history of corporate insolvency remedies). Specifically, by 1870, no
fewer than 14 large railroads-railroads each having at least 100 miles of track-were
insolvent. Albro Martin, Railroads and the Equity Receivership: An Essay on Institutional
Change, 34 J. ECON. HIST. 685, 688 (1974).
20 Stem, supra note 19, at 784.
21 For a detailed description of equity receivership, see 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
0.04, at 28-61 (Lawrence P. King ed., 14th ed. 1978). For a detailed history of the rail-
road reorganizations of 1890s, see STUART DAGGETT, RAILROAD REORGANIZATION
(1908).
22 See Mann v. Pentz, 2 Sand. Ch. 257, 265 (N.Y. Ch. 1845); CHARLES F. BEACH,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF RECEIVERS § 1 (1887). Appointment of a receiver is
one of the oldest remedies in chancery court. Id. § 3.
23 Stern, supra note 19, at 788; see, e.g., Peale v. Phipps, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 368, 374-
75 (1852) (noting that because the property remained in the legal custody of one court,
1993]
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rio, a creditor, usually at the prompting of the railroad debtor's lawyers,
would petition a court of equity for the appointment of a receiver for the
railroad.24 Most often, the receiver the judge appointed was the old manage-
ment of the firm who would continue to run the railroad.
While the railroad was in receivership, committees of various groups of
creditors would be formed. Subsequently, the committees would meet and
agree upon a plan of reorganization, appointing a new reorganization com-
mittee to effectuate the plan. All claims would then be turned over to that
committee and the reorganization plan would specify the amount that each
creditor who surrendered its claim would receive after the reorganization.
Following the formation of the reorganization committee, the receiver
would generally orchestrate a foreclosure sale to the reorganization commit-
tee, typically the only bidder at the sale. As with any receivership, proceeds
of the sale would be distributed to the creditors, in this case, represented by
the reorganization committee. The reorganization committee would then
form a new corporation, placing the assets it acquired in the foreclosure sale
in the new entity. In effect, creditors would give up their claims against the
old firm to the reorganization committee, which acquired assets of the new
firm with money it borrowed on a short-term basis, paid off creditors of the
old firm, and gave these same creditors the stake in the new firm they had
been promised in the reorganization plan. This procedure allowed creditors
to restructure the debt of a large corporation while permitting the corpora-
tion to continue in business as a going concern.25
To ensure that all creditors were treated fairly, 26 courts of equity devel-
oped the practice of setting an "upset price," relying on a model developed
by English courts of chancery.27 The upset price was a judicially determined
minimum price below which the court would not permit the sale of the
entity at a foreclosure sale. By ensuring that the upset price was sufficiently
high, the court theoretically assured minority creditors that they would
receive an amount equivalent to the value of their nonbankruptcy rights. 2
another court could take jurisdiction); Goate v. Fryer, 30 Eng. Rep. 93 (Ch. 1789)
(enjoining creditor from proceeding at law because there had already been an account for
full payment of debts).
24 DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 57-61 (1992); DOUGLAS G.
BAIRD & THOMAS H. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY
959-66 (2d ed. 1990). For a personal account of the role lawyers played, see ROBERT T.
SWAINE, THE CRAVATH FIRM AND ITS PREDECESSORS (1948).
25 See BAIRD, supra note 24, at 58.
26 See Investment Registry, Ltd. v. Chicago & M. Elec. R.R., 212 F. 594, 609 (7th Cir.
1913) (suggesting that bidding bondholders can manipulate prices and monopolize fore-
closure sales); Duncan v. Mobile & O.R.R., 8 F. Cas. 25, 26 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1879).
27 See Jervoise v. Clarke, 37 Eng. Rep. 423, 424-25 (Ch. 1820) (ordering Master to sell
assets in a public sale as long as the sale price is higher than the price set by the court); 1
EDMUND R. DANIELL, DANIELL'S CHANCERY PRACTICE 946, 949 (8th ed. 1914).
28 See First Nat'l Bank of Cincinnati v. Florsheim, 290 U.S. 504 (1934) (holding that a
reorganization plan was a fraudulent conveyance because the price was too low).
[Vol. 73:581
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This solution had limitations. Courts tended to keep the upset price low
to ensure that the reorganization committee could finance a purchase of the
old entity's assets. This low price, however, compelled creditors to tender
their bonds to the reorganization committee even if the plan would give
them less than the value of their nonbankruptcy rights, hence undercutting
the primary rationale for an upset price.
B. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898
The equity receivership process, formulated to mitigate the consequences
of failed railroads, was not a complete success. Recognizing the need for
such a process, and yet dissatisfied with judicial attempts at fostering a solu-
tion to the unique problem of railroads, Congress took the first step toward
enacting reorganization legislation with the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.29
Although the Bankruptcy Act contained no formal business rehabilitation
provision, it displayed "a rather general acceptance of the principle that a
bankruptcy law [was] required in the public interest of the nation" and, per-
haps more significantly, it legitimized bankruptcy law as a way of resusci-
tating businesses in the name of the national interest."0
In 1938, Congress formalized the goal of business debtor rehabilitation by
passing the Chandler Act,"' which added Chapters X, XI and XII to address
business bankruptcies. The Chandler Act's passage indicated Congress's
recognition that the prior business rehabilitation provisions were incomplete
and also served to "express the national policy that the best interests of the
Because there was no statutory procedure for compelling creditors to participate in a
reorganization, any creditor could choose not to assent to the reorganization plan. Credi-
tors who chose not to take part in the reorganization simply had their claims satisfied out
of the proceeds of the sale. See Werner, Harris & Buck v. Equitable Trust Co., 35 F.2d
513, 514 (10th Cir. 1929) (holding that a court could not force a creditor to participate in
a reorganization); Louis HEFT, HOLDERS OF RAILROAD BONDS AND NOTES: THEIR
RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 117 (1916) (noting that creditors could refuse to participate in
reorganization proceedings); James N. Rosenberg, A New Scheme of Reorganization, 17
COLUM. L. REV. 523, 528 (1917) (stating that the court lacked authority to compel
acceptance of a fair plan). The size of their payment, of course, depended directly upon
the price received at the auction.
29 See supra note 17. For a comparison with the current Chapter 11 see Lawrence P.
King, Chapter 11 of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 107 (1979).
30 WARREN, supra note 14, at 144 (asserting that "the chief interest of the Nation lies
in the continuance of a man's business and the conservation of his property for the benefit
of creditors and himself, and not in the sale and distribution of his assets among his
creditors").
31 Ch. 575, 52 Stat. 883 (1938), repealed by Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598,
92 Stat. 2549 (enacting Title XI). Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act, passed in 1934,
had already supplanted equity receivership proceedings. That section was the first federal
provision governing the reorganization of financially distressed corporations. See 48 Stat.
911 (1934). Section 77B was preceded by § 77A, which governed railroad reorganiza-
tions. See 47 Stat. 1467, 1474 (1933).
1993]
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
nation [were] promoted by affording commercial and industrial concerns the
protection of bankruptcy law while they under[went] financial and business
rehabilitation. 32
As enacted, Chapter X of the Chandler Act was designed to rehabilitate
large corporations having publicly held shares and many strata of public and
private debt. To this end, Chapter X contained provisions intended to
achieve this result while protecting the interests of secured and unsecured
creditors.33 A Chapter X reorganization plan, for example, could modify the
rights of the debtor's equity-holders and could stretch out and scale down
claims of secured and unsecured creditors.34  Additionally, Chapter X
required the appointment of a trustee to operate the business in place of
management if the amount of the debtor's uncontingent liabilities totaled
$250,000 or more.3 ' As a practical matter, this meant a trustee was
appointed in virtually every Chapter X case. This particular requirement
was the product of William 0. Douglas, who, while Commissioner of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), chaired an investigation into
the treatment of public investors in corporate reorganizations.' The investi-
gation generated a study, which sharply criticized what it perceived as
abuses against hapless equity-holders by corporate insiders37 and recognized
the potentially undesirable control of management over the reorganization
process. The study recommended that a trustee be appointed in every reor-
ganization case." Finally, Chapter X countenanced participation of the
SEC in reorganization cases as an advocate for public-security holders, as
32 Harvey R. Miller, Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act and Collective Bargaining
Agreements, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 1120, 1122 (1984).
13 See Michael A. Gerber, The Election of Directors and Chapter 11-The Second Cir-
cuit Tells Stockholders to Walk Softly and Carry a Big Lever, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 295,
298 (1987).
34 See id. (citing Bankruptcy Act § 216(1)).
35 Bankruptcy Act § 156.
36 Gerber, supra note 33, at 298. The Douglas invetigation generated a report, which
was published from 1937-1940 in eight parts as the "Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion Report on the Study and Investigation of the Work, Activities, Personnel and Func-
tions of Protective and Reorganization Committees" [hereinafter Douglas Study]. Id. at
298 n.12.
37 Gerber noted that the Douglas Study stated:
[R]eorganizers and investors will at times have different objectives in reorganiza-
tions. Investors will be interested in an expeditious, economical, fair, and honest
readjustment of their company's affairs. ...
Reorganizers at times have not been interested in fair reorganization, since fair-
ness might seriously intrude into their own plans and affairs. Reorganizers at times
have not desired honest reorganizations, in the investors' sense of the word, because
such reorganizations would be costly to them. They have been motivated by other
factors. And they have endeavored-in large measure with success-to mold the
reorganization process so as to serve their own objectives.
Id. at 299 n.14 (quoting Douglas Study, pt. 1, at 2-5).
38 Id. at 300 (citing Douglas Study, pt. 8, at 336-38).
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well as an advisor to the court regarding the fairness of the reorganization
plan.
3 9
Although Chapter X was created for the thoroughgoing reorganization of
an entity, typically involving a firm's complete recapitalization, Chapter XI
was intended to govern simple reorganizations involving smaller, closely-
held businesses. As such, Chapter XI was considerably less elaborate than
Chapter X. A Chapter XI plan, for instance, could alter unsecured claims,
but not modify the rights of secured creditors or equity-holders.40 More-
over, whereas in Chapter X cases management was replaced by a court-
appointed trustee, in Chapter XI, management remained in possession of a
debtor's assets and in control of its affairs unless a receiver was appointed for
cause. 4' Finally, the SEC's role in Chapter XI, in which the debtor had an
exclusive right to propose a reorganization plan, was considerably less than
in Chapter X.'
As one might expect, Chapter XI gradually became the rehabilitation
vehicle of choice not only for managers of small companies, as intended, but
also for managers of large, publicly-held corporations.43 Specifically, manag-
ers preferred Chapter XI because: (1) it minimized the risk that they could
be ousted from control and did not subject their actions to scrutiny by an
3' Bankruptcy Act §§ 172-73, 175; see Michael E. Hooton, The Role of the Securities
and Exchange Commission under Chapter X, Chapter XI and Proposed Amendments to
the Bankruptcy Act, 18 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 427, 429 (1977).
40 Bankruptcy Act §§ 356-57.
41 Id. § 332. As a practical matter, receivers were rarely appointed in some jurisdic-
tions and quite frequently appointed in others. This allocation of control over the reor-
ganization proceeding was consistent with the Douglas Study's finding that in the context
of small businesses, the interests of management and equity-holders would normally be
aligned and the appointment of a trustee would prove both costly and superfluous.
Gerber noted that the Douglas Study observed:
In ordinary bankruptcy proceedings, concerned with the insolvent individual, the
debtor's role is understandably important in the working out of his fortunes, whether
these proceedings be directed to liquidation or to composition. Similarly, where the
bankrupt is a small corporation with stock closely held by those who have managed
the enterprise, the interposition of a corporate entity does not obscure the realities;
there is a practical identity between the bankrupt corporation and its stockholders.
Management and ownership are substantially one, and the case, at least in these
respects, differs little from that of the individual debtor.
The large corporate debtor is far removed from such a state of facts. With stock
widely scattered in a multitude of small holdings, and management and stockholders
distinct groups, little identity may remain between ownership and control. When
such a corporation is in bankruptcy or equity receivership it is irrelevant and confus-
ing to speak of it as the debtor or bankrupt in the same way that these terms are
applied to individuals.
Gerber, supra note 33, at 301 n.20 (quoting Douglas Study, pt. 8, at 98).
42 Bankruptcy Act § 306(1).
43 KEVIN DELANEY, STRATEGIC BANKRUPTCY: How CORPORATIONS AND CREDI-
TORS USE CHAPTER 11 TO THEIR ADVANTAGE 24-25 (1992); DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET
AL., THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 1432 (1992); Gerber, supra note 33, at 302.
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independent trustee; (2) it gave the debtor, and therefore management,
exclusive right to propose a plan, maximizing management's leverage in plan
negotiations; (3) it countenanced a lesser role in the reorganization proceed-
ing for the SEC; and (4) it dealt with unsecured debt only, offering a quicker
and cheaper, although less comprehensive, reorganization alternative than
Chapter X.'
Litigation often arose on this issue because the Chandler Act was not pre-
cise in defining which Chapter a particular business could file under. In the
1940s, 1950s and early 1960s, the SEC often challenged the propriety of
Chapter XI filings and attempted to have many cases converted to Chapter
X to safeguard what it perceived as the public interest.45 By the late 1960s
and 1970s, however, the SEC, primarily because of understaffing, stopped
challenging Chapter XI filings, and Chapter XI evolved into the rehabilita-
tion vehicle of choice for debtor businesses.46
C. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
In 1970, Congress created the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the
United States (the Commission) and directed it to analyze the Chandler Act
and recommend changes in light of financial and commercial develop-
ments.47 After evaluating the current state of bankruptcy law, the Commis-
sion expressed concern that Chapter XI was increasingly used improperly by
44 Gerber, supra note 33, at 302; see also Robert J. Rosenberg, Corporate Rehabilita-
tion under the Bankruptcy Act of 1973: Are Reports of the Demise of Chapter XI Greatly
Exaggerated?, 53 N.C. L. REV. 1149, 1151-52 (1975) (suggesting that allowing manage-
ment to retain their jobs in Chapter XI would inevitably make it the preferred alternative
to Chapter X).
41 See, e.g., SEC v. American Trailer Rentals, 379 U.S. 594 (1965); General Stores
Corp. v. Schlensky, 350 U.S. 462 (1956).
46 Lawrence P. King, The Business Reorganization Chapter of the Proposed Bank-
ruptcy Code-Or Whatever Happened to Chapters X, IX and XII?, 78 CoM. L.J. 429, 430
(1973). By the mid-1970s fewer than 10% of all business reorganization cases were com-
menced under Chapter X. See BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1978, REPORT OF THE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 222 (1977) [herein-
after H.R. REP. No. 595].
47 See DAVID T. STANLEY & MARJORIE GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS,
REFORM 2-7 (1971) (analyzing reasons for Congress's creation of the Commission,
including altering bankruptcy law as a response to a substantial increase in number of
filings following World War II). Ironically, the notion that revision of the Chandler Act
was warranted because of the increasing number of business bankruptcies proved incor-
rect. In actuality, following the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code, one economic study
demonstrated that approximately 19% of business filings between 1978 and 1983 were a
direct result of the broadening of bankruptcy law effectuated by the Bankruptcy Code.
See Gene A. Marsh & David C. Cheng, The Impact of the Bankruptcy Reform Act on
Business Bankruptcy Filings, 36 ALA. L. REV. 515, 535 (1985). For an excellent, concise
historical background to Chapter 11 see Kenneth W. Klee, The New Bankruptcy Act of
1978, 64 A.B.A. 1865, 1866 (1978); Don J. Miner, Comment, Business Reorganization
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large companies. To address this concern, the Commission recommended
that Chapters X and XI be merged into a single rehabilitation chapter.4
The Commission suggested that under this single chapter a trustee be
appointed in any corporate debtor case involving 300 or more security hold-
ers and debts of $1,000,000 or more, unless a trustee was found to be
"unnecessary" or the expense of such protection was determined to be "dis-
proportionate to the protection afforded."49 The SEC both echoed and
expanded upon the Commission's findings, asserting that a trustee was essen-
tial in all reorganizations so that "investors [could] intelligently decide
whether or not proposed plans are fair, equitable, and sound-whether
assets are being wasted or overlooked; whether there is a complete account-
ing for the old venture before the new one is launched; [and] whether the
allocation of assets, earnings, and control are fair."'
Following the Commission's report, Congress began to enact new bank-
ruptcy legislation. This process proved to be extremely contentious as virtu-
ally "every improvement favored by a particular group was strongly opposed
by others. ' ' "l The Senate's version of the bankruptcy bill followed the SEC's
recommendation and provided for the mandatory appointment of a trustee
in any case involving a public company.12 The House's version was consid-
erably different. Believing that the successful rehabilitation of many large
companies in Chapter XI indicated that neither the public nor creditors were
under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: An Analysis of Chapter 11, 1979 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 961, 961-65.
48 The Commission found:
An independent trustee is often desirable, especially in a case involving the reor-
ganization of a corporate debtor having substantial indebtedness and publicly held
securities. At the other end of the spectrum is the closely held corporate debtor
whose existing management is essential to the continued operation; in such a case an
independent trustee is not always needed and is often counterproductive. An arbi-
trary dividing line, such as the dollar formula of Chapter X of the present act, is
undesirable. Indebtedness alone is not an adequate criterion. It does not take into
consideration the nature of the ownership of the debtor or a need to continue
existing management. This arbitrary approach has been a strong motive behind the
expanded utilization of Chapter XI. It also has probably been a factor in delaying
the commencement of reorganizations, to the ultimate detriment of security holders
REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R.
Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 252-53 (1973) [hereinafter H.R. Doc. No.
137].
49 Id. pt. 2, at 261.
50 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 4, at 2178
(1976).
51 Frank R. Kennedy, A Brief History of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 58 N.C. L. REV.
667, 672 (1980).
52 S. REP. No. 2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1104 (1978) ("In the case of a public com-
pany, the court, within ten days after the entry of an order for relief under this chapter,
shall appoint a disinterested trustee.").
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necessarily harmed by allowing the debtor to orchestrate the reorganization,
the House concluded that investors and creditors might benefit from the
retention of management "because the expense of a trustee is not required
and the debtor, who is familiar with his business will be better able to oper-
ate it. ' '"3 The House further suggested that a court be permitted to order the
appointment of a trustee only if "the protection afforded by a trustee is
needed and the costs and expenses of a trustee would not be disproportion-
ately higher than the protection afforded."'
After much debate, the Senate and House enacted compromise legislation
concerning the role of a trustee in reorganization proceedings. This compro-
mise was embodied in § 1104(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides
that the debtor (existing management)' will orchestrate the business affairs
of an entity as well as its rehabilitation unless, on the motion of a party in
interest or the United States trustee, the court orders the appointment of a
trustee "for cause, including fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross mis-
management of the affairs of the debtor by current management" or "if such
appointment is in the interests of creditors, any equity security holders, and
other interests of the estate." 56 As a practical matter, § 1104(a) means that
in typical Chapter 11 reorganization proceedings the existing management of
the business entity will orchestrate its reorganization.
II. THE DEBTOR IN POSSESSION STRUCTURE
A. Debtor in Possession Decision Making
The debtor in possession plays the prominent role in a reorganization pro-
ceeding. Not only is the debtor in possession often the driving force behind
both the negotiation and creation of the reorganization plan, but it also runs
the business on a day-to-day basis. In playing these distinct roles, the debtor
in possession faces three fundamentally different types of decisions.57 First,
because the debtor in possession controls the day-to-day affairs of the busi-
ness it must make choices and decisions about the use of existing assets and
the daily operations of the business. These decisions can be termed "Busi-
ness Activity Decisions." Second, the debtor in possession mediates reor-
ganization negotiations, and shapes the tone and character of settlement
discussions, thereby influencing the outcome of such discussions. Central to
53 H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 46, at 233.
54 Id. at 302.
55 See supra note 8.
56 11 U.S.C. § 1l04(a)(l)-(2) (1988).
57 An important subsidiary issue is who actually makes decisions for the debtor in
possession: the shareholders, the board of directors, the officers, or the attorneys. Com-
mentators have suggested that the debtor in possession usually is the board of directors
and officers. See 6 COLLIER, supra note 21, at 1416; Raymond T. Nimmer & Richard B.
Feinberg, Chapter 11 Business Governance. Fiduciary Duties, Business Judgment, Trustees
and Exclusivity, 6 BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 21; see also 11 U.S.C. app. R. 9001 (Supp. IV 1992).
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this role is an assessment of the viability and validity of the reorganization
proceeding itself." Decisions made in this capacity by the debtor in posses-
sion can be referred to as "Fundamental Bankruptcy Decisions." Finally,
the debtor in possession is expected to make decisions and choices that are
neither pure business operational decisions nor pure bankruptcy decisions.
These "Non-Polar Decisions" involve a balancing and weighing of compet-
ing interests and concerns regarding both daily activities and reorganization
structure, and by nature they are not subject to characterization as either
Business Activity Decisions or Fundamental Bankruptcy Decisions.
1. Business Activity Decisions
Business Activity Decisions concern the use of existing assets as well as
everyday business operations. These decisions run the entire spectrum of
operating an enterprise; their significance cannot be overstated. These
choices not only affect the manner in which the business operates but also
the value the business's assets will produce during liquidation or
reorganization.
The quality of Business Activity Decisions affects not only the size of the
economic pie available to the various creditors and equity holders, but also
the net economic loss caused by the insolvency. Poor decisions will decrease
the size of the pie available for distribution; prudent choices may increase
the size of the available pie. In addition, Business Activity Decisions may
directly affect loss allocation. By reducing the size of the applicable pie, a
poor Business Activity Decision may assure that equity holders are given no
stake in a reorganized entity, rather than a partial one.
The Bankruptcy Code recognizes that Business Activity Decisions involve
matters best decided by persons knowledgeable in business decision making.
Therefore, the Bankruptcy Code ordinarily does not provide for judicial
review of these decisions.59 Section 363, for example, grants the trustee, and
58 The debtor in possession, due to self-interest, bias, or mere optimism, may not be
the party best situated to make this assessment objectively. See infra part II.B-C.
" See 11 U.S.C § 1108 (1988) (providing that "[u]nless the court... orders otherwise,
the trustee may operate the debtor's business"); In re Simasko Prod. Co., 47 B.R. 444,
449 (D. Colo. 1985) ("Business judgments should be left to the board room and not to
this Court."); In re Deluca Distrib. Co., 38 B.R. 588, 591 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984)
(explaining that "[t]he discretion to act with regard to ordinary business matters without
prior court approval is at the heart of the trustee's [the debtor in possession's] powers");
In re Lifeguard Indus., 37 B.R. 3, 17 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983) ("[B]usiness judgments
should be left to the board room and not to this Court."); Central Sales S.E. & S.W.
Areas Health & Welfare & Pension Funds v. Columbia Motor Express, Inc. (In re
Columbia Motor Express, Inc.), 33 B.R. 389, 393 (M.D. Tenn. 1983) ("The Bankruptcy
Code favors the continued operation of a business by the debtor as debtor-in-possession
and a presumption is accorded to the management decisions of the debtor-in-posses-
sion."); In re Curlew Valley Assocs., 14 B.R. 506, 511 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981)
("[D]isagreements over business policy are not amenable to judicial resolution. The
judge is not a business consultant. While a court may pass upon the legal effect of a
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therefore the debtor in possession,' the general authority to use, sell, or
lease property of the estate in the "ordinary course of business" without
obtaining prior court approval.6' Similarly, § 364 authorizes the debtor in
possession to incur unsecured postpetition indebtedness in the "ordinary
course of business" unless the "court orders otherwise."' 2 To induce credi-
tors to provide loans to entities in bankruptcy, these loans enjoy administra-
tive expense priority over various other extensions of credit.'
In accordance with the Bankruptcy Code's preference for the debtor in
possession being solely responsible for making Business Activity Decisions, 
4
courts customarily leave operation of the business to the debtor in posses-
sion's discretion, enforcing choices made by the debtor in possession on
operational matters.6 1 In reviewing a debtor in possession's business deci-
sions, courts typically utilize a corporate law concept,66 upholding these
decisions if they reflect the exercise of rational business judgment.6 7 The
business decision ... this involves a process and the application of criteria fundamentally
different from those which produce the decision in the first instance.").
60 Section 1107(a) provides that the debtor in possession has all of the rights, powers
and obligations of a trustee under the Bankruptcy Code. See I U.S.C. § 1107(a) (1988).
Unless the bankruptcy court orders the appointment of a trustee under § 1104(a), the
debtor (management) will continue to operate the business as the debtor in possession.
Id. § 1104(a).
61 Id. § 363(c).
62 Id. § 364(a).
63 Id. § 503(b)(1).
64 See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 46, at 404; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 116 (1978).
61 See, e.g., In re Airlift Int'l, Inc., 18 B.R. 787, 789 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982) (stating
that policy considerations require that the court not interfere with the trustee's business
decisions); Allied Technology, Inc., v. R.B. Brunemann & Sons, 25 B.R. 484, 495 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1982) ("Court approval of a debtor in possession's judgement that assumption
of a lease is in the best interest of the debtor's business should not be withheld on the
basis of [judicial] second guessing .... ").
66 Alan R. Palmiter, Reshaping the Corporate Fiduciary Model: A Director's Duty of
Independence, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1351, 1358-62 (1989). Palmiter explains:
Courts review management slackness under the [duty of] care regime, which applies
to enterprise ('purely business') decisions untainted by conflicting interests. Filtered
by the forgiving presumptions of the business judgment rule, review applies only in
egregious cases of deliberative inattention or irrational decision making. In the care
regime, plaintiffs must show more than carelessness or unreasonableness. Judicial
abstention is the rule.
Id. at 1358-59.
67 See Committee of Asbestos-Related Litigants v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-
Manville Corp.), 60 B.R. 612, 615-16 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("[T]he Code favors the
continued operation of a business by a debtor and a presumption of reasonableness
attaches to a debtor's management decisions. Where the debtor articulates a reasonable
basis for its business decisions (as distinct from a decision made arbitrarily or capri-
ciously), [we] will generally not entertain objections to the debtor's conduct." (citations
omitted)); Richmond Leasing Co. v. Capital Bank, 762 F.2d 1303, 1311 (5th Cir. 1985)
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United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit summarized the reasons
for adopting this standard:
[I]n the absence of special circumstances or a specific Code provision,
we see no reason to require the debtor to do more than justify its actions
under the "business judgment" standard if creditors object. More
exacting scrutiny would slow the administration of the debtor's estate
and increase its costs, interfere with the Bankruptcy Code's provision
for private control of administration of the estate and threaten the
court's ability to control the case impartially."
Utilizing this standard, courts generally have held that the debtor in posses-
sion exercised proper business judgment so long as it did not engage in self-
dealing, its decision reflected careful investigation and analysis, and the
choice made by the debtor in possession bore some reasonable relationship to
the proper operation of the enterprise.69
Although the Bankruptcy Code permits debtors in possession to engage in
transactions in the ordinary course of business without prior court
approval, ° and courts grant debtors in possession broad latitude with
("We see no reason to require the debtor to do more than justify its actions under the
'business judgment' standard if creditors object.").
68 Richmond Leasing Co., 762 F.2d at 1311 (citations omitted).
69 See In re Southern Biotech, Inc., 37 B.R. 318, 322-23 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1983)
("[T]he court will not entertain objections to the trustee's conduct of the affairs of the
estate where the conduct involves a business judgment made in good faith and made on a
reasonable basis and within the scope of his authority .... "); In re Lyon & Reboli, Inc.,
24 B.R. 152, 154 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982) (noting that reasons for the use of the business
judgment standard include: (1) expediting the administration of the estate; (2) promoting
the private negotiation process; (3) recognizing that the daily operations of the business
do not involve legal decisions; and (4) removing the bankruptcy court from administra-
tive duties); Airlift Int'l, 18 B.R. at 789 ("The broad authority to operate the business of
the debtor which is given to a trustee by § 1108 indicates Congressional intent to limit
court involvement in business decisions by a trustee."); In re Curlew Valley Assocs., 14
B.R. 506, 509-14 (1981) (discussing statutory and policy reasons for discouraging court
supervision of the trustee); H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 46, at 89-91, 95-99, 107-09;
H.R. Doc. No. 137, supra note 48, pt. 1, at 92-93, 348-349 ("Neither referees nor district
judges can adequately police reorganizations. To the extent that they attempt to do so,
they create an appearance of bias. The assurance of the impartiality of the judge is also
enhanced by having the administrator decide whether the business should be operated
and the extent of any operation by the debtor.").
70 Courts typically employ a two-part test to determine whether a transaction is
entered into in the ordinary course of business. First, courts ask whether the applicable
transaction is consistent with the prior practice of the debtor. See, e.g., Johns-Manville,
60 B.R. at 616 ("The vertical dimension or creditor's expectation test examines the
debtor's transaction from the vantage point of a hypothetical creditor and inquires
whether the transaction subjects a creditor to economic risks of a nature different from
those he accepted when he decided to extend credit."). Second, courts inquire into
whether the transaction at issue is ordinary in the debtor's industry. See, e.g., id. at 618
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respect to those decisions that they do review, the Bankruptcy Code requires
that if a transaction falls outside the ordinary course of business, it can only
be concluded with the approval of the bankruptcy court. Section 363(b)(1),
for instance, provides that a debtor in possession can only use, sell, or lease
estate property outside the ordinary course of business after there has been a
"notice and a hearing" before the court.7' Section 364(b)-(d), moreover,
requires court approval before obtaining postpetition financing outside the
ordinary course of business.7"
In recognition of these Bankruptcy Code requirements, courts have
imposed a heightened standard of review when debtor in possession deci-
sions fall outside the ordinary course of business or when a contrary express
statutory standard is present. In complex postpetition financing arrange-
ments, particularly those involving cross-collateralization, h courts consider
a myriad of factors in ruling on the merits of the debtor in possession's deci-
sion, including whether the debtor is "unable to obtain alternative financing
on acceptable terms," whether the proposed lender will "accede to less pref-
erential terms," and whether the "proposed financing is in the best interests
of the general creditor body."74 Likewise, although courts review most exec-
(stating that the horizontal dimension or industry-wide test involves "a comparison of
this debtor's business to other like businesses"); see also Johnston v. First St. Cos. (In re
Waterfront Cos.), 56 B.R. 31, 35 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985) (inventing the labels "vertical"
and "horizontal" in this context).
71 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (providing that "the trustee, after notice and a hearing, may
use, sell, or lease, other than in the ordinary course of business, property of the estate").
Significantly, to assure that the interests of secured creditors are adequately protected,
§ 363(c)(2) prohibits the use, sale or lease of cash collateral---cash, negotiable instru-
ments, documents of title, securities, deposit accounts, or other cash equivalents--even in
the ordinary course of business without prior court approval of creditor consent. Id.
§ 363(a), (c)(2).
72 Id. § 364(b)-(d).
73 Cross-collateralization is a form of credit enhancement utilized to induce postpeti-
tion lending. Cross-collateralization permits a secured creditor to reduce or eliminate
prepetition collateral shortfalls by taking a security interest in property acquired postpeti-
tion to secure both prepetition and postpetition advances. Notably, creditors often pres-
sure debtors into accepting cross-collateralization clauses. See Charles J. Tabb, A Critical
Reappraisal of Cross-Collateralization in Bankruptcy, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 109, 110 (1986);
Charles J. Tabb, Emergency Preferential Orders in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 65 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 75, 85-92 (1991); Charles J. Tabb, Lender Preference Clauses and the
Destruction of Appealability and Finality." Resolving a Chapter 11 Dilemma, 50 OHIO ST.
L.J. 109, 116 (1989).
71 In re Vanguard Diversified Inc., 31 B.R. 364, 366 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983) (stating
that cross-collateralization is a last resort that should only be used when other financing
is not available and the proposed financing is in the best interest of the general creditors).
But see Shapiro v. Saybrook Mfg. Co. (In re Saybrook Mfg. Co.), 963 F.2d 1490, 1494-95
(11 th Cir. 1992) (noting that cross-collateralization is inconsistent with the Bankruptcy
Code).
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utory contract decisions 75 pursuant to a business judgment standard, 76
courts employ a heightened standard of scrutiny when rejection of a contract
has a particularly egregious effect on a particular individual,77 or when the
Bankruptcy Code compels a heightened standard. 7  Finally, courts have
subjected the business discretion of the debtor in possession to more exacting
scrutiny when the proposed action resolves the majority of economic issues
present in the reorganization proceeding. 79 Typically, this situation arises
when the debtor in possession contemplates a sale of the primary assets of
the entity or the creation of new contractual relationships that will dominate
the affairs of the postpetition entity. 0
75 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (allowing the debtor in possession generally to assume or reject
an executory contract). An executory contract is most commonly defined as a "contract
under which the obligation of both the bankrupt and the other party to the contract are
so far unperformed that the failure of either to complete performance would constitute a
material breach excusing the performance of the other." Vern Countryman, Executory
Contracts in Bankruptcy (pt. 1), 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 460 (1973).
76 See, e.g., Lubrizol Enter. v. Richmond Metal Finishers Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 1046
(4th Cir. 1985) (stating that bankrupt's decision "is to be accorded the deference man-
dated by the sound business judgment rule"); In re Prime Motor Inns, 124 B.R. 378, 381
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1991) (recognizing the long standing "traditional business judgment
standard applied by the courts to authorize rejection of the executory contract"); Black-
stone Potato Chip Co. v. Mr. Pepper, Inc. (In re Blackstone Potato Chip Co.), 109 B.R.
557, 560 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1990) (stating that the business judgment standard is appropriate
in determining whether a debtor may reject or accept an executory contract).
11 See, e.g., In re Petur U.S.A. Instrument Co., 35 B.R. 561 (Bankr. W.D. Wash.
1983) (although applying the business judgment rule, bankruptcy court would not
authorize debtor's rejection of executory contract when granting of motion would result
in destruction of business of the nondebtor party and damages sustained by nondebtor
party would be grossly disproportionate to any benefit derived by general creditors); Rob-
ertson v. Pierce (In re Chi-Feng Huang), 23 B.R. 798 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982). Applying
the business judgment rule, the Chi-Feng Huang court stated:
[It] is proper for the court to refuse to authorize rejection of a lease or executory
contract where the party whose contract is to be rejected would be damaged dispro-
portionately to any benefit to be derived by the general creditors of the estate. ...
This statement does not sanction rejection of a contract because of a generalized
concern that a party whose contract is rejected will be damaged.
Id. at 801.
78 Section 365(h), for instance, limits the effect of rejection of a lease of real property
when the debtor is a landlord, whereas § 1113 limits the rejection of collective bargaining
contracts in Chapter 11 cases. 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(h), 1113.
71 Nimmer & Feinberg, supra note 57, at 15-20; see id. at 15 ("The business discretion
of the debtor in possession will also be subject to more intense overview when the pro-
posed business action either expressly or de facto substantially resolves most economic
issues present in the reorganization.").
80 See Institutional Creditors of Continental Air Lines v. Continental Air Lines, Inc.
(In re Continental Air Lines, Inc.), 780 F.2d 1223, 1226 (5th Cir. 1986) (limiting asset
sale when a sale constitutes a sub rosa plan of reorganization); Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corp. v. Braniff Airways, Inc. (In re Braniff Airways, Inc.), 700 F.2d 935, 940 (5th Cir.
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2. Fundamental Bankruptcy Decisions
Fundamental Bankruptcy Decisions are central to the bankruptcy reor-
ganization. These decisions involve choices about whether to proceed with
the reorganization or liquidation of the entity as well as the manner in which
the assets and losses of the entity will be allocated in the entity's restructur-
ing. In brief, Fundamental Bankruptcy Decisions require the debtor in pos-
session to decide both whether reorganization or liquidation will maximize
the size of the economic pie and what division of that pie is optimal."
The decision regarding whether to reorganize or liquidate the enterprise is
critical because of the inherent costs that accompany each choice. If the
debtor in possession elects to reorganize a company that is not economically
viable 2 and should be liquidated, then resources are squandered as the entity
attempts to engage unsuccessfully in a restructuring. All the parties in inter-
est will bear these costs to the company, and the overall size of the pie avail-
able for distribution will decrease.
Similarly, the debtor in possession faces the difficult task of allocating
losses among the various claimants. It serves as an arbitrator in a zero sum
game: dollars given to one group in a financial restructuring are lost by
another. Deciding who wins and loses the game involves choices between a
number of competing interests.
Considering the divergent interests among the competing parties high-
lights the difficult task faced by the debtor in possession. Consider, for
example, the incentives of equity holders in a bankruptcy proceeding.
Equity holders have the lowest priority in bankruptcy and hence are unlikely
to receive anything in a liquidation. Accordingly, they have a strong incen-
tive to encourage the continuation of the entity's operation despite economic
realities. Unsecured general creditors who also have low priority have a sim-
ilar incentive to choose reorganization over liquidation."
1983) ("[T]he debtor and the Bankruptcy Court should not be able to short circuit the
requirements of Chapter 11 for confirmation of a reorganization plan by establishing the
terms of the plan sub rosa in connection with a sale of assets."); see also Committee of
Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d 1063, 1071 (2d Cir.
1983) (requiring a "good business reason" to approve the proposed sale); In re Public
Serv. Co., 90 B.R. 575, 581 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1988) (applying the Lionel standard and
denying transfer of assets because no sound business justification to support transfer
existed); In re Naron & Wagner, Chartered, 88 B.R. 85 (Bankr. D. Md. 1988) (applying
the Lionel standard and approving proposed sale of subsidiary owned by debtor).
81 The debtor in possession's decision does not occur in a vacuum; creditors influence
such a decision. For instance, a secured creditor may file a § 362(d) motion seeking a
lifting of the automatic stay on the grounds that its interest is not "adequate[ly] pro-
tect[ed]." 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1988). The net effect of the successful resolution of this
motion on the creditor's behalf may be to force the debtor into choosing liquidation over
reorganization.
82 That is, its total revenues will not meet or exceed its total costs, even with restruc-
turing. See infra part IV.B.
83 JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMITS, supra note 3, at 189 ("[G]eneral creditors and share-
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By contrast, secured creditors are likely to view the liquidation of the busi-
ness as a desirable result regardless of whether the reorganized entity has a
positive going concern value. Any going concern value will not benefit
senior claimants such as secured creditors," whereas they may bear the cost
of a failed attempt at reorganization. Thus, debtors in possession will feel
pressure exerted by senior claimants to liquidate rather than reorganize the
entity and these senior claimants will expect, if reorganization is chosen,
concessions in their favor in return for acceding to reorganization. 5
3. Non-Polar Decisions
One might characterize the final type of decisions faced by the debtor in
possession as Non-Polar Decisions. These decisions are neither pure Busi-
ness Activity Decisions nor Fundamental Bankruptcy Decisions, but rather
involve elements attributable to both.
An example of a decision that properly could be characterized as a Non-
Polar Decision is the sale of a large corporate subsidiary of an entity in bank-
ruptcy. The sale of such a subsidiary affects not only the use of existing
assets but also the assets available for allocation. As such, it can neither be
characterized as a pure Business Activity Decision nor a pure Fundamental
Bankruptcy Decision but rather as a Non-Polar Decision properly made by
the debtor in possession both in consideration of the day-to-day business
affairs of the corporation as well as in contemplation of loss allocation
among the claimants. As noted above, courts recognizing the nature of these
Non-Polar Decisions review debtor in possession decisions outside the ordi-
nary course of business with a heightened standard of review. 6
holders (who often have more to gain than to lose from delay) ... tend to be excessively
optimistic and opt for reorganization when it is unwarranted."); see 11 U.S.C. § 726 (pri-
oritizing claims in a liquidation).
I A corollary to the absolute priority rule is that senior claims may not receive com-
pensation in excess of their prepetition claims. See generally Kenneth N. Klee, All You
Ever Wanted to Know About Cram Down Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 133 (1979) (explaining priority of claims in bankruptcy).
85 Importantly, as this Article will develop, infra part IV.B, the debtor in possession
perhaps should also be required to take into account the interests of parties affected by
the proceeding who are not regarded as traditional claimants in bankruptcy, such as
employees. Of course, one might expect that employees would prefer reorganization over
liquidation so that they can retain their jobs.
This dichotomy of interests aptly illustrates the battles among parties that exist in a
typical Chapter 11 scenario. Not only do the debtor and creditors have diametrically
opposed positions in many cases, but creditors may often battle creditors in formulating
options regarding liquidation versus reorganization.
86 See supra part II.A. 1.
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B. The Debtor in Possession Structure: A Separation of Ownership and
Control
Over fifty years ago in a preeminent work, Professors Adolf Berle and
Gardiner Means questioned the notion of "shareholder primacy" because of
the separation of ownership and control present in the corporate form. 7
They asserted that shareholders generally were passive owners of the corpo-
ration and widely diversified risk bearers who had little incentive or ability
to monitor managers' activities in the corporations in which shareholders
invested.88 Corporate managers, by contrast, typically owned little of the
stock of the corporation for which they were employed and yet controlled
the entity's operations. Because managers had little invested in the firm,
their primary goal was often not to maximize shareholder wealth, but rather
their own utility.89
Furthermore, Berle and Means suggested that the ability of shareholders
to elect directors, and thereby control management, was relatively meaning-
less in the context of large corporations. They asserted that management
controlled the proxy machinery and hence the outcome of the election.'
Management, in short, had become a self-perpetuating oligarchy, which only
outside regulation could remedy. 9'
Modem economic theorists view the problems created by a separation of
ownership and control differently than Berle and Means. These theorists see
the corporation as the central party to a contractual arrangement between
managers and owners by which factors of production are combined.92 As
theorists Professors Michael Jensen, William Meckling, and Eugene Fama
contend, this interrelationship between managers and owners by necessity
involves an agency relationship in which the owners (shareholders) serve as
principals, receiving the benefits of the firm's profitability and growth, and
management as their agents.9' In essence, owners bear the risks associated
with the enterprise while managers run the corporation, as specialized deci-
sion makers, for the benefit of the owners.
The primary benefit of this corporate form is readily apparent. Skilled
managers, who might lack capital, are able to run the corporation, and
shareholders, who might lack managerial skills, may invest in the firm and
realize a return on their investment. 4 This specialization of functions also
87 ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 244 (1932); see also Matheson & Olson, supra note 9, at 1330-33
(discussing the history of corporate governance principles and solutions to the problem of
separation of ownership and control).
88 See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 87, at 119-25.
89 See id.
90 Id. at 207-19.
91 Id. at 124.
92 See, e.g., Jensen & Meckling, supra note 9, at 306.
aa See, e.g., id.; Fama & Jensen, supra note 9, at 302.
91 Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON.
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allows investors to diversify their portfolios, thus reducing risk and making
investment more attractive.9" This agency relationship, however, is not
without cost. Foremost, the agency relationship exposes owners to the risk
that managers will use owners' funds for management's benefit, thereby cre-
ating agency costs-the costs to the principal of obtaining faithful and effec-
tive performance by its agent." From this perspective, the dilemma of the
separation of ownership and control is not viewed in terms of "shareholder
primacy," as advocated by Berle and Means, but rather as a question of how
to reduce agency costs incurred by owners in monitoring their agents so as to
prevent fiduciary abuse.
Traditionally, the problem of agency costs has been addressed in a variety
of ways. Corporate law imposes liability on managers for any breach of the
fiduciary duties of loyalty and care that management owes to shareholders.97
Under the duty of care standard, a manager must act in good faith, with the
care an ordinarily prudent person in a similar position under similar circum-
stances would exercise and in a manner he or she reasonably believes to be in
the best interests of the corporation.9" The business judgment rule provides
288, 290-92 (1980); Fama & Jensen, supra note 9, at 302; Eugene F. Fama & Michael C.
Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 26 J.L. & ECON. 327, 329-30 (1983).
9 Portfolio theory provides that investors may reduce their risk by investing in many
different companies. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain
in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 17-20 (1986) (stating that portfolio theory
divides the risk associated with any security into two components: a firm-specific compo-
nent and a systematic or nondiversifiable component associated with general market con-
ditions); Fama & Jensen, supra note 94, at 329 ("Common stock allows residual risk to be
spread across many residual claimants who individually choose the extent to which they
bear risk and who can diversify across organizations offering such claims.").
I See Fama & Jensen, supra note 9, at 304 (defining agency costs as the costs of
structuring, monitoring, and bonding a set of contracts among parties with conflicting
interests); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 9, at 293.
91 See generally ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 93-141 (1986) (explaining
management's fiduciary duties).
98 See Palmiter, supra note 66, at 1358. Invoking the business judgment rule permits
courts to avoid second-guessing the merits of a business decision provided there is no
evidence of bad faith or self-dealing on the part of management. See Melvin A. Eisen-
berg, The Duty of Care of Corporate Directors and Officers, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 945, 948
(1990) (stating that a corporate director's duty of care consists of three distinct duties: (1)
the duty to monitor the corporation's business; (2) the duty to inquire about information
that raises cause for concern; and (3) the duty to exercise care in making decisions, both
procedurally and substantively). See generally DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS
JUDGMENT RULE-FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS 28
(3d ed. 1989) (explaining the duty of care); WILLIAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY,
LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS § 2.01, at 37 (4th ed. 1988) (con-
demning personal dealing by officers or directors).
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that courts should presume managers have fulfilled the requisite duty of care
unless the manager has acted with gross negligence.
99
To protect against management making self-interested decisions, the duty
of loyalty requires managers to make decisions that are in the best interests
of the corporation."°° In essence, this duty prohibits management from self-
dealing and acting faithlessly to the corporation.' 0 ' To ensure compliance
with this duty, courts employ a strict standard of review for management
decisions involving a direct conflict of interest.1
0 2
Beyond these fiduciary duties, other forces act to constrain managerial
indiscretion, including market forces and contractual arrangements between
managers and the firm. Contractual relationships can reduce agency costs
by providing shareholders with the ability to displace management, such as
through the periodic election of the board of directors, 03 as well as a means
by which management's interests can be aligned with that of the firm, by
such incentives as performance-based compensation or stock options.
o4
Market forces, such as the labor market,' production markets,'0° and mar-
ket for corporate control, 0 7 also may constrain managerial abuses. As pro-
ponents of the market-monitoring theory posit, corporations offering
9 E.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 n.6 (Del. 1983) (stating that Delaware
cases impose a less exacting standard than simple negligence).
100 See Kenneth E. Scott, Corporation Law and the American Law Institute Corporate
Governance Project, 35 STAN. L. REV. 927, 937-40 (1983).
101 BLOCK ET AL., supra note 98, at 73.
102 Palmiter, supra note 66, at 1364-65.
103 See, e.g., DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 221 (1991) (stating that the certificate of incor-
poration may provide shareholders and creditors with the power to vote on displacing
management).
lO' Jensen & Meckling, supra note 9, at 323-38; Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosen-
blum, A New System of Corporate Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58
U. CHI. L. REV. 187, 196-97 (1991); see also Fama, supra note 94, at 293 (disputing the
notion that fractional ownership by managers will itself reduce agency costs).
105 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91
YALE L.J. 698, 701 (1982) (stating that management is constrained by salary, bonuses
and reputation); Fama, supra note 94, at 288 (suggesting that the desire for positive eval-
uation of ability and such evaluation's affect on current employment and on the marketa-
bility for alternate and future employment will restrain managers from acting
inconsistent with the interests of corporate owners).
10 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 105, at 701 (stating that fierce product competi-
tion demands a diligently and efficiently managed firm).
107 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of Target Manage-
ment in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1169-73 (1981); Michael
C. Jensen & Richard S. Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5, 6
(1983); see Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643 (1982) (recognizing validity of mar-
ket for corporate control). But see John C. Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate
Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1153-54 (1984) (rejecting the notion of a market for corporate
control).
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shareholders the highest returns will garner the largest investments and
hence prosper relative to other entities.'08
The separation of ownership and control, widely discussed in the context
of solvent corporations, also is present in insolvent corporations ° 9 because
of the debtor in possession structure. In an insolvent corporation the credi-
tors constitute a new group of owners, which management, acting as the
debtor in possession, should serve as their agent.'" This separation of own-
ership and control has three principal effects: (1) it alters the parties to
whom management (now the debtor in possession) owes a fiduciary duty; (2)
it imposes agency costs; and (3) it increases the overall costs of the given
bankruptcy proceeding by increasing the likelihood of improper Fundamen-
tal Bankruptcy Decisions.
C. Principal Effects of the Debtor in Possession Structure
1. Fiduciary Duties
In the context of solvent corporations, managers owe fiduciary duties of
care and loyalty to the equity holders."' In contrast, if the business becomes
insolvent the managers (now the debtors in possession) will have an
expanded responsibility to all parties that comprise the estate," 2 including
its creditors."13 To fulfill this duty, the debtor in possession will have to
'08 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1419-21 (1989).
109 For purposes of this Article, an entity is "solvent" when the value of its assets
exceed its liabilities and "insolvent" when its liabilities exceed the value of its assets. See
11 U.S.C. § 101(32) (Supp. IV 1992).
11o In the solvent corporation scenario, equity holders are the residual claimants and
thus are best positioned to monitor management to ensure it maximizes the corporation's
value. By contrast, once a corporation is insolvent, creditors have the most direct finan-
cial interest in reorganization decisions and hence are expected to monitor the debtor in
possession.
111 See supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text.
112 E.g., FDIC v. Sea Pines Co., 692 F.2d 973, 976-77 (4th Cir. 1982) ("When the
corporation becomes insolvent, the fiduciary duty of the directors shifts from the stock-
holders to the creditors."), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 928 (1983); Henderson v. Buchanan, (In
re Western World Funding, Inc.), 52 B.R. 743, 763 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1985) (citing Pepper
v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306-07 (1939) ("[When a] corporation is insolvent, [a manager's
legal] duties run to creditors.")); In re Baldwin-United Corp., 43 B.R. 443, 459 n.22 (S.D.
Ohio 1984) (finding that when the corporation becomes insolvent the directors become, in
effect, trustees for the creditors).
Some take issue with the notion that managers are obligated to consider the interests of
creditors when a firm becomes insolvent. See BAIRD, supra note 24, at 208 (arguing that
because in a Chapter 11 proceeding, creditors are given their own representative through
the creditors' committee and equity holders do not have such representation a shifting of
duties is not consistent with Chapter 11).
"I See In re Central Ice Cream Co., 836 F.2d 1068 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating that the
debtor in possession has a duty to maximize the value of estate); Manville Corp. v. Equity
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make decisions that will benefit some claimants at the expense of others.
Pursuant to this role of loss allocator, the debtor in possession has the power
to: propose reorganization plans differentiating among classes of credi-
tors,. 4 reject or assume executory contracts,115 object to claims, 116 and
decide whether to seek avoidance of some preexisting transfers and
obligations."7
Although the debtor in possession has some limitations on its power," 8 its
task is both open-ended and extremely difficult; it must attempt to maximize
the size of the estate's pie while equitably allocating the pie among the vari-
ous parties. Maximization and allocation of the estate's assets can be espe-
cially difficult because various parties may have differing economic
incentives in bankruptcy. For example, fully secured creditors may desire an
immediate liquidation of the entity. They have little to gain if the firm con-
tinues and much to lose if it ultimately fails to reorganize while depleting the
value of secured assets. Unsecured creditors and equity holders, by contrast,
may have an incentive to delay liquidation while increasing enterprise risk in
the hope of receiving an increased share of the reorganized entity.
Consider, for example, a firm with total assets available for distribution
today valued at ten million dollars and outstanding liabilities valued at
nineteen million dollars. If the firm is liquidated today, assume the secured
creditors will be paid in full-a total of nine million dollars. By contrast,
assume that unsecured creditors receive a mere ten percent of their entire
claims and equity holders receive nothing.
In turn, posit a situation where the firm is reorganized and continues in
business for two years before its ultimate liquidation. Assume now that
under this scenario the firm's assets are still valued at ten million dollars,
and the firm owes nineteen million dollars, but the value of the secured col-
lateral is only four million five hundred thousand dollars. Here, the secured
creditors' secured claim is only one-half of the value in the above scenario,
with the remainder becoming an unsecured claim.'19 Correspondingly,
Sec. Holders Comm. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 52 B.R. 879, 885 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1985) (stating that the debtor in possession is "bound to act in best interest of the corpo-
ration [and] as fiduciar[y] of the estate"); In re Coastal Equities, Inc., 39 B.R. 304, 309
(Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1984) (stating that the debtor in possession owes fiduciary duty to the
estate); Nimmer & Feinberg, supra note 57, at 30-34.
"I See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1121(a), 1123(a) (1988).
115 See id. § 365(a).
11 See id. § 1106(a).
117 See I I U.S.C. § 544 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
118 For example, some executory contracts cannot be rejected, others cannot be
assumed, and still others can be rejected only on proof of a clear burden to the estate. See
id. §§ 365, 1113. Likewise, in proposing a reorganization plan, the debtor in possession
must consider the requirements of the absolute priority rule. See II U.S.C. § 1129 (1988)
(providing a set of requirements for court approval of a reorganization plan).
119 This section is intended to show how the interests of the various parties are diverse.
To alleviate this problem, the Bankruptcy Code provides "adequate protection" to a
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unsecured creditors, including the claims of the undersecured secured credi-
tors are left to share in a five million five hundred thousand dollar pool, not,
as above, in a one million dollar pool. While an immediate liquidation of the
corporation satisfied a mere ten percent of the total claims of the unsecured
creditors, a liquidation after an attempted reorganization satisfied over
thirty-seven percent of the total unsecured claims. 2 ' Choosing among the
conflicting interests of the various claimants while attempting to maximize
the value of the estate pursuant to its fiduciary duties is an arduous task
facing the debtor in possession.
2. Agency Costs
As noted above, the separation of ownership and control produces agency
costs. Insolvent corporations present this phenomenon because the debtor in
possession controls the process of reorganization and loss allocation,' 2' even
though the residual claimants, the creditors, and equity holders own the
corporation.
Significantly, the unique environment of Chapter 11 reorganization pro-
ceedings can create an even greater potential for increased agency costs than
usually occur in the context of solvent corporations. 122 A predominant rea-
son for these increased costs is that creditors and equity holders face a
higher cost of monitoring managers in bankruptcy because the information
available for public consumption often is reduced. 123 This reduction in avail-
secured creditor. 11 U.S.C. § 361. However, because a secured creditor must wait for
satisfaction of its claim even in a best case reorganization, a secured creditor would likely
prefer a liquidation.
120 See BAIRD, supra note 24, at 131-32.
121 Under the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor in possession is given significant discretion
in many key areas including classification of claims, 11 U.S.C. § 1122 (1988), rejection of
executory contracts, id. § 365(a), and use of avoidance powers, 11 U.S.C. § 544 (1988 &
Supp. IV 1992); see 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (1988) (giving the debtor in possession powers
similar to the trustee). Additionally, managers are given the exclusive right during the
first 120 days of reorganization to propose a reorganization plan, id. § 1121(b), and in
formulating such a plan are expected to make numerous subjective judgments about the
valuation of assets and projection of earnings. See In re United States Truck Co., 47 B.R.
932, 941 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (stating that no "mathematical formula" exists for asset valu-
ation), aff'd sub nom. Nat'l Freight Indus. Negotiating Comm. v. United States Truck
Co., 800 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1986).
122 See MARTIN J. BIENENSTOCK, BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATION 66 (1987) ("To
whatever extent management ... may be motivated to put its survival ahead of share-
holders' interests, bankruptcy exacerbates ... that motivation."); Gerber, supra note 33,
at 347 ("[B]ankruptcy is precisely the time when the ills commonly attributed to the
separation of corporate ownership from control-managerial unaccountability and self-
interest-are likely to be most exacerbated.").
123 See Erica M. Ryland, Bracing for the "Failure Boom": Should a Revlon Auction
Duty Arise in Chapter 11, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2255, 2258-63 (1990) (discussing agency
costs in bankruptcy). Importantly, the debtor in possession must meet certain reporting
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able information is attributable to several factors. First, the Bankruptcy
Code permits the debtor in possession to formulate and implement an initial
reorganization plan' 24 without interference from the residual claimants and
without having to provide any information to such claimants. 125 Second, the
company frequently postpones shareholders' meetings,126 delists the stock if
it is publicly held, 127 and delays SEC reports. 12  Finally, equity holders are
less able to monitor managers because the Bankruptcy Code does not require
that an equity holders' committee be appointed, leaving the matter wholly to
the discretion of the bankruptcy court." 9
In addition to increased monitoring costs, the residual claimants also
requirements regarding the status of the reorganization. See 11 U.S.C. app. R. 2015
(Supp. IV 1992). As a general proposition, however, the flow of information to creditors
and shareholders often decreases with the filing of bankruptcy.
124 The 120 day exclusivity period granted to debtors in possession with respect to
plan formulation is often extended to a year or more, see, e.g., In re United Press Int'l,
Inc., 60 B.R. 265, 269-70 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1986), and allows the debtor in possession to
exert significant agenda influence. See Michael E. Levine & Charles R. Plott, Agenda
Influence and Its Implications, 63 VA. L. REV. 561, 564-65 (1977) ("An agenda influ-
ences outcomes .... "); Nimmer & Feinberg, supra note 57, at 65-66 ("Because Chapter
11 allows the parties to vote only on plans that have been officially proposed, the right of
proposal carries with it an ability to influence the terms of the plan.").
125 See In re Texaco, Inc., 81 B.R. 806, 809 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) (stating that the
debtor's management should be given an opportunity to formulate a reorganization plan
"without interference from creditors and other[s]"). Although the Bankruptcy Code pro-
vides that creditors and equity holders must be provided with summaries of proposed
reorganization plans and appropriate written disclosure statements, see 11 U.S.C. § 1125
(1988), the Bankruptcy Code does not contain disclosure requirements akin to those con-
tained in the Securities Act of 1933 or the Exchange Act of 1934. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77-78
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (as amended).
126 See Manville Corp. v. Equity Sec. Holders Comm. (In re Johns-Manville), 66 B.R.
517, 542 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1986) (granting the debtor in possession an injunction prohib-
iting a shareholder's meeting when the purpose of the meeting was to elect new directors
and propose a new plan more favorable to the shareholders); In re Saxon Indus., 39 B.R.
49, 50 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (finding that management refused to schedule shareholder
meetings); Lionel Corp. v. Committee of Equity Sec. Holders of the Lionel Corp. (In re
Lionel Corp.), 30 BR. 327, 330 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (discussing "long overdue
annual meetings").
127 Delisting usually occurs because share trading volume has fallen below mandatory
exchange minimums. See NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL
§ 801.00-9.00 (1989). This can reduce the flow of information. For example, if a stock is
delisted, it will no longer have to comply with the New York Stock Exchange require-
ment that companies respond to certain market rumors or disclose material developments
in their businesses. See id. §§ 202.03, 202.05; see also Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note
5, at 1075 tbl. I 1 (noting that 16.7% of publicly traded companies that filed for bank-
ruptcy had their stock delisted within two years of filing).
128 SEC reports are often delayed due to the cost of reporting and because companies
no longer benefit from incentives granted for timely filings.
129 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a) (1988).
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experience a heightened collective-action problem." ° This problem results
from the value of the residual claimants' interests being reduced in bank-
ruptcy, while their costs of action remain constant or even increase.131
Moreover, even if the residual claimants continue to have an incentive to
monitor the debtor in possession because of the potential value of a success-
ful reorganization, uncertainty inherent in the bankruptcy process often can
serve to diminish this incentive.
Two final factors raise agency costs in bankruptcy by making it difficult
and costly to challenge debtor in possession decisions. First, the class voting
mechanism for plan approval, requiring the consent of more than one-half of
the holders of a given class of debt as well as holders of two-thirds of the
principal amount of the requisite class,13 2 prevents a creditor from buying up
two-thirds of the principal amount of a given class and proposing its own
plan if two other holders remain.133 Second, the requirement that any party
proposing a reorganization plan file a disclosure statement is advantageous
to the debtor in possession because preparing such a statement is much eas-
ier for the debtor in possession given its knowledge of the business."a
3. Bankruptcy Costs
The firm's bankruptcy costs are another product of the separation of own-
ership and control inherent in the debtor in possession structure. Two dis-
tinct types of bankruptcy costs exist: indirect costs and direct costs. Direct
bankruptcy costs are the transaction costs of the bankruptcy proceeding.
Direct bankruptcy costs include the costs of judicial resources as well as
legal, accounting, and financial advisory fees. These costs are essentially
wealth transfers from one group to another and as a general proposition are
quantifiable.13 1
130 See Baird & Jackson, supra note 12, at 106 (noting that the fundamental purpose
of bankruptcy law is to solve the collective action problem by "requir[ing] ... investors to
act collectively rather than to take individual actions that are not in the interests of the
investors as a group").
131 An example of higher costs in bankruptcy is evident in the operation of the auto-
matic stay, which stops any judicial proceeding against the debtor. See 11 U.S.C. § 362
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992). A party in interest, such as a creditor, can seek to lift the
automatic stay, but only upon demonstrating cause or showing that the debtor does not
have any equity in the property and such property is not necessary to an effective reor-
ganization. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1988).
132 See id. § 1126(c).
133 See Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas M. Mayer, Trading Claims and Taking Control
of Corporations in Chapter 11, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 86 (1990); cf In re Allegheny
Int'l, Inc., 118 B.R. 282, 290 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990) (finding that a purchase of claims to
form a blocking position after the debtor has already proposed a plan of reorganization
amounts to bad faith).
134 BIENENSTOCK, supra note 122, at 580.
131 See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Bankruptcy in the Administrative State, 50 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 42 n.177 (1987) (estimating direct costs of bankruptcy); Jerold B.
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By contrast, indirect bankruptcy costs can be explained as the "other"
costs of bankruptcy. Examples of these "other" costs include the diminution
in stock value of an entity that has filed for bankruptcy protection' and the
unquantifiable costs occurring when an entity chooses reorganization,
although liquidation is the preferable alternative.'37 These indirect bank-
ruptcy costs are the social costs of bankruptcy. That is, they increase margi-
nal costs of production by increasing, for example, the costs that credit
lenders charge because they believe debtors will prefer Chapter 11 over
Chapter 7, even though Chapter 7 may be the better economic alternative.
Although difficult to quantify, these indirect bankruptcy costs can be sub-
stantial, as illustrated by the Texaco-Penzoil legal battle regarding Getty Oil
when Texaco, seeking to avoid liability arising from a devastatingly unfavor-
able jury verdict, declared bankruptcy and suffered a diminution in stock
value of over four billion dollars. 38
The debtor in possession structure and its requisite separation of owner-
ship and control primarily is responsible for these sizeable indirect bank-
ruptcy costs. Current bankruptcy law places the debtor in possession in the
role of making both Business Activity Decisions and Fundamental Bank-
ruptcy Decisions. In making these decisions, the debtor in possession will
make decisions favorable to it, whether or not such decisions are favorable to
the new residual owners of the corporation, the creditors. Most importantly,
with respect to Fundamental Bankruptcy Decisions, one can expect debtors
Warner, Bankruptcy Costs: Some Evidence, 32 J. FIN. 337, 339 (1977); Lawrence A.
Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation of Priority Claims, 26 J. FIN.
ECON. 285, 286, 289 (1990) (estimating average cost of large bankruptcies to be 2.8% of
assets).
136 Clearly, the prospect and actual filing of bankruptcy, and the accompanying nega-
tive stigma associated with bankruptcy, will diminish the stock value of a corporate
entity. See, e.g., Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 5, at 1067-69; David M. Cutler &
Lawrence H. Summers, The Cost of Conflict Resolution and Financial Distress: Evidence
from the Texaco-Penzoil Litigation, 19 RAND J. ECON. 157, 159-64 (1988). Notwith-
standing this decrease in stock value, however, Chapter 11, rather than the gasp of a
troubled company, has become an alternative that managers often embrace irrespective of
a corporation's solvency. See DELANEY, supra note 43, at 160-90. But see Susan Rose-
Ackerman, Risk Taking and Ruin: Bankruptcy and Investment Choice, 20 J. LEGAL
STUD. 277, 279 (1991) (arguing that most managers seek to avoid bankruptcy). More-
over, an active market exists for the shares of bankrupt companies as evidenced by the
number of mutual funds that purchase the shares of such entities including: Merrill
Lynch Phoenix A, Third Avenue Fund, Fidelity Capital & Income, and Mutual Beacon.
131 As this Article will develop, liquidation is the preferred alternative if the liquida-
tion value of a given entity exceeds its reorganization value. See infra part IV.B.2.
138 Cutler & Summers, supra note 136, at 160. One study placed the combined direct
and indirect costs to an entity of bankruptcy at a range from 11-17% of the firm's value
within three years of bankruptcy. Edward I. Altman, A Further Empirical Investigation
of the Bankruptcy Cost Question, 39 J. FIN. 1067, 1087 (1984).
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in possession to favor reorganization over liquidation even when the pre-
ferred choice for the entity and the residual owners is liquidation.
Debtors in possession will likely favor reorganization for two reasons.
First, debtors in possession (management) may have an equity stake in the
corporation, especially in the context of small corporations in which manag-
ers often are the principal owners. 9 This equity interest will induce the
debtor in possession to make decisions that benefit equity holders at the
expense of other claimants, including creditors. Because equity holders gen-
erally receive very little in a liquidation, one would expect that they would
prefer, and attempt to engage in, a reorganization, despite its effects on the
other claimants. Although preferring reorganizations over liquidations, per-
ceived wealth maximization in Chapter 11 relative to Chapter 7 may influ-
ence the debtor in possession. 40
A mathematical model illustrates the effects of the alignment of manage-
rial and equity interests in bankruptcy. A debtor in possession contemplat-
ing bankruptcy faces two alternatives: liquidation or reorganization.
Assume the liquidation value of the firm's assets is L and the transaction
costs of liquidation are TL. The expected present value of future earnings of
the firm in reorganization is R. Suppose, moreover, the transaction costs of
reorganization are TR.
The debtor in possession, with an equity stake in the firm, can be expected
to choose between the two alternatives according to which alternative maxi-
mizes the value of equity.' 4' Pursuant to these assumptions, debtors in pos-
139 Of course, managers of large companies also often own shares in the entity,
although usually their ownership interest is relatively small. Cf Lynn M. LoPucki &
William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large,
Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 669, 689 (1993) (explaining why managers
may not align with shareholders).
140 See Allan C. Eberhart et al., Security Pricing and Deviations from the Absolute
Priority Rule in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 45 J. FIN. 1457, 1458 (1990) (noting that
amounts paid to shareholders of bankrupt companies in excess of appropriate amounts
under the absolute priority rule represent 7.6% of the total amount awarded to all
claimants).
141 A model derived from the work of Michelle White can explain the debtor's incen-
tives in greater mathematical detail. See Michelle J. White, Bankruptcy Costs and the
New Bankruptcy Code, 38 J. FIN. 477 (1983). Posit a two period model: The firm has
unsecured loans due in tj = 1991 of principal amount U1 and in t2 = 1992 of principal
amount U 2 and secured loans due in t2 = 1992 of S. Assume the interest rate and the
discount rate are zero and that secured loans are riskless. The firm's earnings in t, are P,
and in t2 are P2 + g, where g is a random variable distributed normally with mean 0 and
variance ag .
The debtor in possession, with an equity stake in the firm, can be expected to choose
between the two alternatives according to which maximizes the value of equity. The
value of equity if liquidation occurs in t, = 1991 is (L-TL-S-UI-U 2), if greater than zero.
Consider now reorganization when the plan is confirmed immediately. In this instance
the firm's unsecured liabilities are cut back to r% of their previous level. Also, the firm
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session may have incentives to make economically inefficient decisions and
therefore generate indirect bankruptcy costs. From an economic efficiency
viewpoint, the best use of the firm's assets requires choosing the alternative
having the highest value between the choices L - TL or R - TR. Thus
liquidation is preferred if L - TL > R - TR, but the debtor in possession
has an incentive to choose liquidation or reorganization depending on which
option maximizes the value of equity. If the economically efficient alterna-
tive also maximizes the value of equity, then the debtor in possession has an
incentive to make economically efficient decisions and indirect bankruptcy
costs are nominal.' However, if an economically inefficient alternative
maximizes the value of equity, then the debtor in possession has an incentive
to make inefficient decisions, hence generating indirect bankruptcy costs
equal to the amount of the efficient alternative less the alternative chosen.
Not unexpectedly, unsecured creditors bear the primary costs of debtors in
possession aligning their interests with equity without considering the effi-
cient alternative.
4 3
More significantly, debtors in possession are more likely to favor reorgani-
zations because they are its principal beneficiaries.'" Not only does Chapter
11 provide a corporate debtor with considerable latitude regarding its credi-
tors, 145 it also offers managers an opportunity to retain their jobs and orches-
trate the reorganization as the debtor in possession.146 This inducement of
must pay TR in transactions costs in t2. Accordingly, the firm's outflows in t, are TR +
rU,, if we assume rUl will be paid in full in 1991. Reorganization is only viable if earn-
ings, Pi, exceed this amount or if the firm can obtain a new secured loan. The condition
for the latter is rUl + TR - P, < L - TL - S. The value of equity under reorganization
is
fb00[P2-g-rU2-S-S* ]f(g)dg
where S* = rUl + TR - P1, the amount borrowed in t1, if greater than zero. Equity
receives nothing in that period. In t2 it may receive earnings net of debt payments as cut
back under the reorganization plan, if these are positive, or else zero. The minimum level
of earnings necessary to avoid liquidation in t2 is P2 + g =rU2 + S + S*. The cutoff
level of g is denoted by b.
142 There are, of course, still direct bankruptcy costs.
14s See White, supra note 141, at 479.
144 See Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 5, at 1076-77.
141 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1991) (providing for automatic stay of creditor
claims); id. §§ 542-43 (permitting trustee to compel creditors to return collateral); 11
U.S.C. §§ 544-45, 547-49, 552-53 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (affording trustee certain
avoiding powers).
146 See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control-Systems Failure Under Chapter
11 of the Bankruptcy Code? 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 247, 265 (1983). Two studies report
that on average only 29% of corporate managers and only 46% of incumbent directors
remain in office following a corporate reorganization. Stuart C. Gilson, Management
Turnover and Financial Distress, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 241, 247 tbl. 3 (1989); Stuart C. Gil-
son, Bankruptcy, Boards, Banks, and Blockholders, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 355, 386 (1990).
The obvious retort to these studies, even accepting their findings, is that for managers and
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continued employment, intended by Congress, 47 is particularly appealing to
management given both their past investments of human capital in the firm
and their probable reluctance to associate with a failed entity.
III. BANKRUPTCY CODE SOLUTIONS TO THE
DEBTOR IN POSSESSION DILEMMA
The Bankruptcy Code offers four principal solutions to the dilemma cre-
ated by the separation of ownership and control inherent in the debtor in
possession structure: (1) it provides that the debtor in possession has a fiduci-
ary duty to act in the best interests of the entity's claimants; (2) it creates
creditors' committees and allows for the creation of equity holders' commit-
tees to influence debtor in possession decision making; (3) it permits claim-
ants to propose reorganization plans distinct from that offered by the debtor
in possession; and (4) it provides for the removal of the debtor in possession
in certain circumstances. The legal and practical limitations placed on these
provisions, however, make them ineffective in curbing debtor in possession
abuses.
A. Fiduciary Duties of the Debtor in Possession
As noted previously, the Bankruptcy Code imposes a fiduciary duty upon
all the claimants of the estate:
48
[I]f a debtor remains in possession-that is, if a trustee is not
appointed-the debtor's directors bear essentially the same fiduciary
obligation to creditors and shareholders as would the trustee for a
debtor.... Indeed, the willingness of courts to leave debtors in posses-
sion "is premised upon an assurance that the officers and managing
employees can be depended upon to carry out the fiduciary responsibili-
ties of a trustee.'
149
This expanded fiduciary duty of the trustee (the debtor in possession), not
only to consider the interests of equity holders as in the case of solvent cor-
porations, but also the interests of creditors,' 5° stems from the notion that a
directors a 30-50% chance of retaining their jobs is better than the prospect that awaits
them if the firm is liquidated: unemployment. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 139,
at 726 (noting that in 72% of the cases studied corporate managers were replaced during
the pendency of the Chapter 11 case).
147 See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 46, at 232-34.
148 See 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (1988).
14 Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 355 (1985)
(quoting Wolf v. Weinstein, 372 U.S. 633, 651 (1963)).
150 Notably, even outside of bankruptcy, some courts have suggested that if the busi-
ness becomes insolvent then the fiduciary obligations of the directors expand to include
the interests of creditors. See, e.g., FDIC v. Sea Pines Co., 692 F.2d 973, 976-77 (4th Cir.
1982) (commenting that "[w]hen the corporation becomes insolvent, the fiduciary duty of
the directors shifts from the stockholders to the creditors"), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 928
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corporate entity should be operated to respond to the interests of those who
hold an immediate financial stake in the entity.151 In the solvent corpora-
tion, the shareholders hold such a stake. In an insolvent corporation, how-
ever, because the firm's assets are inadequate to pay off all of its debts,
the claims of the creditors take on a significance akin to those of the
shareholders.152
Although the debtor in possession structure, in theory, seems a plausible
solution to the problem of the separation of ownership, in practice the
expansion of fiduciary duty principles to embrace all claimants fails to align
adequately the interests of debtors in possession with other claimants. Most
problematically, because loss allocation involves a zero sum game, the vari-
ous interests of equity holders and creditors frequently will conflict. A
debtor in possession decision benefitting one group may harm another. This
dichotomy of interests greatly complicates fulfillment of the debtor in posses-
sion's fiduciary duties to the entire estate.
Additionally, while the debtor in possession may owe fiduciary duties of
care and loyalty to all claimants of the estate, 53 debtor in possession actions
seldom are subject to judicial review and only rarely overturned. Applying
the business judgment test employed in the context of solvent corpora-
tions,154 courts have granted debtors in possession broad "discretion to exer-
cise reasonable judgment,"' 55 overruling the debtor in possession's decision
only where there is evidence of "fraud, bad faith, gross overreaching or
abuse of discretion."'" In a few limited instances, courts have employed a
(1983); Allied Indus. Int'l, Inc. v. AGFA-Gevaert, Inc., 688 F. Supp. 1516, 1521 (S.D.
Fla. 1988) ("As president, director, and sole shareholder [he] owed a fiduciary duty to
[the corporation's] creditors."), aff'd without opinion, 900 F.2d 264 (11th Cir. 1990);
Rosebud Corp. v. Boggio, 561 P.2d 367, 372 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977); Tigrett v. Pointer,
580 S.W.2d 375, 385 (Tex. Ct. App. 1978).
151 See Nimmer & Feinberg, supra note 57, at 31-32.
152 Id.
153 See HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 235
(3d ed. 1983).
1' See, e.g., Treadway Co. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying
the business judgment rule to incumbent management's decision concerning whether to
issue and sell stock); Crouse-Hinds Co. v. Internorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690, 702 (2d Cir.
1980) (finding that the business judgment rule "bars judicial inquiry into actions of cor-
porate directors taken in good faith and in the exercise of honest judgment in the lawful
and legitimate furtherance of" the corporation).
15 See Armstrong World Indus., Inc. v. Phillips (In re James A. Phillips, Inc.), 29
B.R. 381, 394 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (noting that so long as the action taken by the
debtor fits within the reasonable expectations of the creditors, the action will not be sub-
ject to review by the court); Allied Technology, Inc., v. R.B. Brunneman & Sons, Inc. (In
re Allied Technology, Inc.), 25 B.R. 484, 495 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982).
1M See Treadway, 638 F.2d at 382 (noting that absent evidence of self-dealing, bad
faith, or fraud, the business judgment rule presumes that directors act in good faith and
therefore need not account for their actions); Crouse-Hinds, 634 F.2d at 702.
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higher standard of review. Specifically, courts have used" a higher standard
of scrutiny when investigating purported violations of the duty of loyalty," 7
when a decision imposes a large adverse impact on a particular party,158 or
where the character of a decision is such that it essentially dominates the
outcome of the entire case.'5 9 In these rare instances, courts have required
the debtor in possession to present "a good business reason" to justify its
actions.'0 Generally, however, courts have granted debtors in possession
broad discretion in fulfilling their fiduciary duties.
The consequences of this standard of review are readily evident. Because
a court is unlikely to overturn debtor in possession decisions, fiduciary duties
imposed on debtors in possession do little to curb their indiscretions. Thus,
without any practical bite, the debtor in possession's current fiduciary duties
are an inadequate solution to the dilemma posed by the separation of owner-
ship and control in the debtor in possession structure.
B. Creditors' and Equity Holders' Committees
The Bankruptcy Code also attempts to curb debtor in possession indiscre-
tions through the utilization of a committee structure. Under the Bank-
ruptcy Code, a debtor in possession can both utilize assets in the ordinary
course,161 as well as propose a reorganization plan. 6 2 In each instance, how-
ever, these debtor in possession powers are subject to a secured creditor's
right to protect its security interest16 3 and to insist on receiving no less than
the value of its collateral."c
Although the Bankruptcy Code does not provide unsecured creditors or
equity holders with rights in specific property, it does provide any "party in
151 See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939) (subjecting director's dealings
with the corporation to rigorous scrutiny and placing the burden on the director "to
prove the good faith of the transaction but also to show its inherent fairness from the
viewpoint of the corporation").
158 See, e.g., Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v.
Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 440 (1968) (reversing the lower court's approval of a plan of
reorganization because excluding shareholders left a question of whether the plan was fair
and equitable under the Bankruptcy Act); In re Petur U.S.A. Instrument Co., 35 B.R.
561, 563 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1983) (refusing to authorize the debtor's rejection of an
executory contract when such rejection would destroy a profitable business).
'I See, e.g., Committee of Equity Security Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel), 722
F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that a judge must determine that there is a good busi-
ness reason to sell an important asset outside the ordinary course of business); In re
Public Serv. Co., 90 B.R. 575, 581 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1988) (applying a higher standard of
review than the business judgment rule for transactions not in the ordinary course of
business); see also Nimmer & Feinberg, supra note 57, at 14-20.
160 In re Lionel, 722 F.2d at 1071; accord In re Public Serv. Co., 90 B.R. at 581.
161 See 11 U.S.C. § 364(a) (1988).
162 See id. §§ 1121(a)-(b).
163 See id. § 362(d).
164 See id. § 1129(b).
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interest" with the ability to raise and be heard on any issue in the case. 1
Chapter 11 specifically requires that a United States Trustee appoint a com-
mittee of creditors holding unsecured claims as soon as practicable in every
case. 166 Moreover, Chapter 11 grants the bankruptcy court authority to
order the appointment of additional creditors' committees and an equity
security holders' committee, if such committees are necessary to "assure
adequate representation of creditors or equity security holders.' ' 67
Under the Bankruptcy Code, the creditors' committee is composed of
those creditors willing to serve who hold the seven largest unsecured claims
against the debtor."6 The responsibilities of the committee are multi-fold:
(1) to consult with the debtor in possession regarding case administration; 6 9
(2) to investigate the condition and conduct of the debtor; 70 (3) to partici-
pate in plan formulation; 17' and (4) to perform other services that are in the
interest of those represented. 172 In theory, committees should have signifi-
cant influence over the outcome of the reorganization proceeding, hence
curbing debtor in possession indiscretions. In practice, however, they rarely
exert such influence.
Several factors explain this failure. First, although the Bankruptcy Code
provides that the United States Trustee "shall appoint a committee,' 73 one
study has suggested that committees are actually appointed in less than half
the Chapter 11 cases.' 74 Even when committees are appointed, they are
rarely active.' Second, courts seldom exercise their power to appoint addi-
165 The term "party in interest" includes "the debtor, the trustee, a creditors' commit-
tee, an equity security holders' committee, a creditor, an equity security holder, or an
indenture trustee." Id. § 1109(b).
166 See id. § 1102(a).
167 Id. § 1102(a)(2); see, e.g., Committee of Asbestos-Related Litigants v. Johns-
Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 32 B.R. 728, 730 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
168 11 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(1). In practice, the creditors' committee often involves a dis-
tinctly different group of creditors.
169 Id. § 1103(c)(1).
170 Id. § 1103(c)(2).
'7' Id. § 1103(c)(3).
172 Id. § 1103(c)(5); see In re George Worthington Co., 921 F.2d 626, 633 (9th Cir.
1990) (citing In re GHR Energy Corp., 35 B.R. 539, 543 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983)).
173 See 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (emphasis added).
174 LoPucki, supra note 146, at 250 (stating that creditors' committees are appointed
in only 40% of cases studied). But see LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 139, at 681
(noting that in large corporate bankruptcies-those involving corporations with over
$100 million in assets-a committee was appointed in all but one instance).
175 Jerome R. Kerkman, The Debtor in Full Control A Case for Adoption of the
Trustee System, 70 MARQ. L. REV. 159, 183 (1987) (claiming that creditors' committees
are active in only 16-38% of cases studied); LoPucki, supra note 146, at 250-51 (stating
that in cases studied only 47% of creditors' committees appointed counsel, only 11% of
creditors' committees employed accountants, and none proposed a reorganization plan or
filed an objection to proposed plans); cf LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 139, at 681
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tional creditors' or equity holders' committees. Usually, courts only create
additional creditors' committees when there is an intense level of conflict in
the committee structure.17  Third, courts typically only authorize the crea-
tion of an equity holders' committee where: (1) the number of shareholders
is large; (2) the case is exceedingly complex; and (3) the benefits of the com-
mittee outweigh its costs. 7
Several other elements contribute to the ineffectiveness of committees.
The lack of compensation beyond expenses 17 provided to committee mem-
bers is problematic because it creates a disincentive for spending considera-
ble time on committee matters. Moreover, the committee members rarely
have the expertise required for them to conduct their expected duties. Few
have experience with reorganization proceedings and still fewer are equipped
with the skills required to evaluate and investigate a debtor's business or
reorganization plan. 79 In short, individual creditors or equity holders rarely
will exercise this diffuse right to be heard because of the prohibitive costs
involved." ° Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the effectiveness of
these committees is limited by their inability to control directly the debtor in
possession. They can only influence debtor in possession actions, not compel
them.
(finding that in 43 cases studied, only 20 involved appointment of additional creditors'
committees).
176 See, e.g., In re Texaco, Inc., 79 B.R. 560, 567 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) (stating that
"[a] separate committee of unsecured industry creditors should not exist mainly as a
vehicle to [keep Penzoil off the General Creditor's Committee]"); In re Baldwin-United
Corp., 45 B.R. 375, 376 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983) (declining to appoint additional credi-
tors' committee solely due to a conflict among the creditors in a committee).
177 See, e.g., Alberto v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 68 B.R.
155, 159-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); In re Mansfield Ferrous Castings, Inc., 96 B.R. 779, 781
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988) (declining to appoint an official committee of equity holders
because existing unofficial committee adequately represented shareholders' interests);
Manville Corp. v. Equity Security Holders Comm. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 52 B.R.
940, 943 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985) (same).
178 See, e.g., In re Colorado-Ute Elec. Ass'n, 132 B.R. 183, 184-85 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1991) (holding that members of creditors' committee were entitled to reimbursement for
expenses); In re Northeast Dairy Coop. Fed'n, 76 B.R. 914, 916 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1987)
(same); In re GHR Energy Corp., 35 B.R. 539, 543 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983) (same); In re
Pennsylvania Tire & Rubber Co., 25 B.R. 18, 19 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982) (same). But
see In re Automotive Nat'l Brands, Inc., 65 B.R. 412, 414 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1986) (hold-
ing that the creditors' committee will not be reimbursed for expenses); In re Interstate
Restaurant Sys., 30 B.R. 32, 33 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1983) (same).
171 See LoPucki, supra note 146, at 251-53.
180 For example, if unsecured claims are likely to receive a mere 10 cents on the dollar,
it is unlikely that holders of these claims will have an incentive to challenge debtor in
possession decision making.
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C. Reorganization Plans
The third prominent limitation imposed on debtor in possession decision
making by the Bankruptcy Code is the ability of "any party in interest,
including... a creditors' committee" to propose a plan of reorganization. 8'
As commentators have noted, "this reservoir of power should make the
debtor more sensitive to the desire of creditors with respect to the actual
plan of reorganization."'8 2 In brief, it offers other parties a direct opportu-
nity to shape the entity's restructuring as well as loss allocation.
Unfortunately, a number of limitations on this right restrict the ability of
committees to address debtor in possession abuses. Foremost, the Bank-
ruptcy Code provides that the debtor in possession has an exclusive right to
file a reorganization plan during the first 120 days of the case.183 Moreover,
upon request of a party in interest, this exclusive period may be extended
"for cause.' i8 4 The Bankruptcy Code does not define "cause," leaving the
meaning of the phrase to be gleaned from the facts and circumstances of
each individual case, 185 and allowing courts to extend the 120 day period at
the debtor in possession's request.18
The exclusive right to propose a plan carries with it the ability to present
an agenda. This important ability, in turn, allows the debtor in possession to
influence the outcome of the plan. For example, in formulating a plan the
debtor in possession has some latitude in defining how creditors are classified
for purposes of payment and voting. By manipulating these classifications,
the debtor in possession can enhance the probability of confirmation of a
plan that it views favorably.' 8
7
181 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c) (1988).
182 J. Ronald Trost & Lawrence P. King, Congress and Bankruptcy Reform Circa
1977, 33 Bus. LAW. 489, 536 (1978).
183 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b).
184 Id. § 1121(d).
185 See In re Public Serv. Co., 88 B.R. 521, 533-34 (1988) (citing 5 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY 1121.04, at 1121-14 to 1121-17 (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1979)).
186 E.g., Gaines v. Perkins (In re Perkins), 71 B.R. 294, 297 (W.D. Tenn. 1987) (grant-
ing extension based on statutory language, congressional intent, and logic); In re United
Press Int'l, 60 B.R. 265, 269 (Bankr. D.C. 1986) (finding that the debtor in a major,
complex case was "extraordinarily" diligent and displayed both speed and skill in the face
of major obstacles, thereby warranting an extension of the period of exclusivity); In re
Manville Forest Prod. Corp., 31 B.R. 991, 994-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (granting debtor's
request for an extension because of sheer mass, weight, volume, and complexity of case),
aff'd sub nom. Florida Partners Corp. v. Southeast Co. (In re Southeast Co.), 868 F.2d
335 (9th Cir. 1989); see LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 139, at 693 (noting that bank-
ruptcy judges extended exclusivity period in 34 of 43 cases studied).
187 See Teamsters Nat'l Freight Indus. Negotiating Comm. v. United States Truck Co.
(In re United States Truck Co.), 800 F.2d 581, 586-87 (6th Cir. 1986) (permitting classifi-
cations based on desire to create a consenting class of creditors); Barnes v. Whelan, 689
F.2d 193, 200-02 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (permitting classifications resulting in wide variations
in distributions so long as all claims placed within the same group are "substantially
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Even when the exclusivity period expires, other parties to the reorganiza-
tion proceeding seldom file reorganization plans.188 Two considerations may
shed light on this phenomenon. First, creditors' committees are unlikely to
propose a plan that requires the liquidation of the business since they invari-
ably receive little or nothing in a liquidation.189 Second, parties other than
the debtor in possession generally lack both access to reliable information as
well as skills necessary to interpret any information they may be able to
acquire.90
D. Replacement of the Debtor in Possession
The final mechanism the Bankruptcy Code employs to control debtor in
possession actions is to allow, in certain circumstances, the debtor in posses-
sion's replacement. Section 1104 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a
trustee can be appointed to replace the debtor in possession, and thus oper-
ate the business, under two circumstances: (1) "for cause"; or (2) if such
appointment is "in the interests of creditors, any equity security holders, and
other interests of the estate."' 19' Section 1104(a)(1) further defines "cause"
to include "fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross mismanagement of the
affairs of the debtor by current management, either before or after the com-
mencement of the case.'
' 192
Typically, courts have sanctioned the replacement of the debtor in posses-
sion "for cause" if the debtor in possession's decisions constitute gross mis-
management or incompetence, 193 if the debtor in possession engages in self-
similar"); Thomas C. Given & Linda G. Phillips, Equality in the Eye of the Beholder-
Classification of Claims and Interests in Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 43 OHIO ST. L.J.
735, 765-68 (1982) (discussing interests that determine appropriate classifications); Peter
E. Meltzer, Disenfranchising The Dissenting Creditor Through Artificial Classification or
Artificial Impairment, 66 AM. BANK. L.J. 281, 320 (1992) (discussing means by which
dissenting creditors are disenfranchised through debtor manipulations). But see Travel-
ers Ins. Co. v. Bryson Properties, XVIII (In re Bryson Properties, XVIII), 961 F.2d 496,
502 (4th Cir. 1992) ("[A]ithough separate classification of similar claims may not be
prohibited, it 'may only be undertaken for reasons independent of the debtor's motivation
to secure the vote of an impaired, assenting class of claims.' ") (quoting Phoenix Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. Greystone III Joint Venture (In re Greystone III Joint Venture), 948
F.2d 134, 139 (5th Cir. 1992)); Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Greystone III Joint
Venture (In re Greystone III Joint Venture), 948 F.2d 134, 139 (5th Cir. 1992) ("[T]hou
shalt not classify similar claims differently in order to gerrymander an affirmative vote on
a reorganization plan."); In re Pine Lake Village Apartment Co., 19 B.R. 819, 829-31
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (disallowing creation of separate classes of unsecured creditors in
order to obtain accepting class).
188 LoPucki, supra note 146, at 254-57.
189 See supra part III.B.
'1 See supra part II.C.2.
191 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)-(2) (1988).
192 Id. § 1104(a)(1).
9 See, e.g., In re Mako, Inc., 102 B.R. 809, 812 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1988), (citing In
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dealing or there are indications of a conflict of interest,' 94 if the debtor in
possession diverts estate property so that it is no longer available for credi-
tors, either before or after filing, 95 or if the court determines that parties
lack confidence in the debtor in possession's abilities."a In determining
whether the second prong of § 1104(a) is met, courts have "look[ed] to the
practical realities and necessities"' 197 of the case. 98 In so doing, courts have
engaged in a rudimentary form of cost-benefit analysis, asking whether "the
benefits derived by the appointment of a trustee [outweigh] the cost[s] of the
appointment,"' 9 9 or, alternatively, if the "trustee will accomplish the goals of
the Chapter 11 plan more efficiently and effectively." 2'
re Brown, 31 B.R. 583 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1983) ("Gross mismanagement suggests some
extreme ineptitude on the part of the management to the detriment of the organization.");
In re Paolino, 60 B.R. 828, 829 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986) (affirming bankruptcy judge's
opinion that "the debtors had demonstrated an inability to [manage] their financial
affairs"); In re Horn & Hardart Baking Co., 22 B.R. 668, 671 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982)
(finding appointment of trustee appropriate when debtor had suffered significant losses
after filing due to mismanagement); Dardarian v. La Sherene, Inc. (In re La Sherene,
Inc.), 3 B.R. 169, 175-76 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980) (noting that gross mismanagement
often includes elements suggesting fraud as well as negligence); cf In re Microwave Prod.
of Am., 102 B.R. 666, 675 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1989) (noting that the availability of
superior management is not necessarily grounds for appointment of a trustee); Mid-
atlantic Nat'l Bank v. Anchorage Boat Sales, Inc. (In re Anchorage Boat Sales, Inc.), 4
B.R. 635, 644-45 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980) (noting that appointment of trustee requires
something beyond a finding of simple mismanagement).
19 See, e.g., In re Sharon Steel Corp., 871 F.2d 1217, 1126 (3d Cir. 1989) (finding that
violative management practices include payments to chief executive officer without con-
sideration); Oklahoma Ref. Co. v. Blaik (In re Oklahoma Ref. Co.), 838 F.2d 1133, 1135
(10th Cir. 1988) (appointing trustee after debtor in possession transferred assets in a way
that harmed estate); In re McCorhill Publishing, Inc., 73 B.R. 1013, 1017 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding that management had conflicting interests in affiliated companies
that engaged in self-serving transactions to the detriment of debtor); In re Colby Constr.
Corp., 51 B.R. 113, 116-17 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985) (find the majority shareholder's use
of corporate assets to be self-dealing).
"I' See, e.g., In re Bonded Mailings, Inc., 20 B.R. 781, 784-86 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982)
(finding that management engaged in fraudulent conduct by shifting assets among corpo-
rate debtors in an effort to confuse their records); In re Main Line Motors, Inc. 9 B.R.
782, 783 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981) (replacing debtor in possession because its president
withdrew funds from the debtor's operations and placed them in control of two non-
debtor affiliates).
196 See, e.g., In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 113 B.R. 164, 169-71 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1990); In re Cardinal Indus., Inc., 109 B.R. 755, 765-66 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990).
197 Hotel Assocs. v. Trustees of Cent. States S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund (In re
Hotel Assocs.), 3 B.R. 343, 345 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980).
198 In re Ionosphere Clubs, 113 B.R. at 168.
19' Id. at 168; see also In re Microwave Prod. of Am., 102 B.R. 666, 676 (Bankr. W.D.
Tenn. 1989) (weighing the costs and benefits of appointing a trustee).
2o0 In re Parker Grande Dev., Inc., 64 B.R. 557, 561 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1986). Nota-
bly, courts have also approved the appointment of trustees in situations outside of those
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Besides the appointment of a trustee, equity holders of the corporation can
also remove and replace the debtor in possession by electing a new board of
directors.20 ' In Saxon Industries, Inc. v. NKFW Partners (In re Saxon
Industries),202 for example, the bankruptcy court approved an equity
holder's request to engage special counsel to represent it in a Delaware chan-
cery court action seeking to compel an annual meeting of shareholders. The
Saxon court noted that shareholders were entitled to pursue all available
alternatives to assert their rights against the debtor, including the election of
directors. °3
Finally, the Bankruptcy Code provides that instead of appointing a
trustee, the court can appoint an examiner to investigate and report on the
honesty and competency of the debtor in possession.2 4 Although an exam-
iner's primarily investigatory role205 is not akin to that of a trustee, the
appointment of an examiner-as well as the prospect of such an appoint-
ment-is intended to curb debtor in possession dishonesty, mismanagement,
and incompetence.
For several reasons, the ability to replace the debtor in possession is inef-
fective in addressing the difficulties caused by a separation of ownership and
control in bankruptcy. The parties who can seek the replacement of the
debtor in possession through § 1104-creditors and equity holders206 -are
unlikely to galvanize to action because they face both increased monitoring
countenanced by § 1104. See, e.g., In re Gaslight Club, Inc., 782 F.2d 767, 769-71 (7th
Cir. 1986) (upholding management consent to the appointment of a "[r]esponsible
[o]fficer"); In re United Press Int'l, 60 B.R. 265, 270-75 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1986) (upholding
consent order abolishing the debtor's board of directors); cf In re John Peterson Motors,
Inc., 47 B.R. 551, 553 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985) (stating that the court's intentions can be
accomplished by appointing an examiner instead of a trustee).
201 See In re J.P. Linahan, Inc., 111 F.2d 590, 592 (2d Cir. 1940) (stating that "the
right of the majority stockholders to be represented by directors of their own choice and
thus to control corporate policy is paramount"); Van Siclen v. Bush (In re Bush Terminal
Co.), 78 F.2d 662, 664 (2d Cir. 1935) (recognizing power to elect a new board, which will
act in conformance with stockholders' wishes).
202 39 B.R. 49 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984).
203 Id. at 50.
204 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1104(b), 1106(b). Pursuant to § 1104(b), an examiner can be
appointed when: (a) a trustee is not appointed; (b) a party in interest requests appoint-
ment of an examiner; and (c) the debtor's nontrade, nontax, unsecured debts exceed $5
million or "such appointment is in the interests of creditors, any equity security holders,
and other interests of the estate." Id. § 1104(b).
205 On occasion, courts have broadened the duties of an examiner to include mediation
over plan disputes, see In re Public Serv. Co., 99 B.R. 177, 182 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1989); In
re UNR Indus., 72 B.R. 789, 793-95 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987), as well as the short-term
operation of the business. See, e.g., In re John Peterson Motors, 47 B.R. 551, 553 (Bankr.
D. Minn. 1985).
206 See 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a).
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costs and an aggravated collective action problem.2"7 Even in the rare
instances when claimants seek the replacement of debtors in possession,
courts treat the appointment of a trustee as an "extraordinary remedy,"2 8
and infrequently replace the debtor in possession."°
Courts resist appointing a trustee for three reasons. First, courts probably
accept implicitly Congress's belief that reorganizations are likely to be more
successful if the "debtor ... remain[s] in control to some degree. '10 Sec-
ond, courts are sensitive to cost concerns regarding the reorganization pro-
ceeding and generally avoid appointments that increase the reorganization's
overall cost.21  Third, courts may be suspicious as to the underlying motive
surrounding the request for an appointment of a trustee.1 2
Likewise, the election of a new board of directors and the appointment of
an examiner also are rare events. Courts do not permit the replacement of a
board of directors by election if such a replacement jeopardizes the overall
success of the reorganization.1 3 Moreover, since shareholders generally
have little to gain in a reorganization, they have little incentive to assure that
the debtor in possession makes prudent decisions. Also, courts are not com-
pelled to appoint an examiner and frequently resist doing so. 2 1 4
The final difficulty with the removal of the debtor in possession is that it
comes too late in the process. The rare appointment that does take place
will usually occur after the debtor in possession has decided to proceed with
a reorganization, although a liquidation may be in the other claimants's best
207 See supra part II.C.
208 See Hotel Assocs. v. Trustees of Cent. States S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund (In
re Hotel Assocs.), 3 B.R. 343, 345 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980).
209 LoPucki, supra note 146, at 264-65; LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 139, at 699-
700.
210 H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 46, at 231.
211 See, e.g., In re Parker Grande, 64 B.R. 557, 561 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1986).
212 See, e.g., In re Stein & Day, Inc., 87 B.R. 290, 295 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) (finding
that motion for appointment was simply a tactical response of a creditor to debtor's pre-
vious application to cite creditor for its contumacious conduct).
213 See, e.g., In re Potter Instrument Co., 593 F.2d 470, 475 (2d Cir. 1979) (finding
that election of new board would in fact be hostile to the interests of reorganization and
therefore ordering delivery of proxies); Haugh v. Industries, Inc. (In re Public Serv.
Holding Corp.), 141 F.2d 425, 426 (2d Cir. 1944) (suspending annual shareholders meet-
ing until after deciding whether or not to dismiss an involuntary proceeding); cf Manville
Corp. v. Equity Sec. Holders Comm. (In re Johns-Manville), 801 F.2d 60, 65 (2d Cir.
1986) (allowing shareholders to elect a new board when intent of electing a new board of
directors is merely to increase leverage and does not substantially decrease the risk of
rehabilitation).
214 See, e.g., In re Revco D.S., Inc., 93 B.R. 119 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988) (stating that
"shall" does not require the appointment of an examiner where the debtor's debts exceed
$5 million); In re Shelter Resources Corp., 35 B.R. 304, 305 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1983)
(refusing to appoint an examiner where debts exceeded $5 million and only other argued
ground for appointment was to investigate a settled shareholder derivative action).
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interests. Hence, the appointment will not completely alleviate many sub-
stantial bankruptcy costs.
IV. A PROPOSED SOLUTION TO THE CHAPTER 11 DILEMMA
The Bankruptcy Code fails to address adequately the problem of the sepa-
ration of ownership and control inherent in the debtor in possession struc-
ture. This failure increases indirect bankruptcy costs and hence the overall
cost of bankruptcy. This Article posits a two-prong solution to the Chapter
11 dilemma: (1) removing debtors in possession from their role in making
Fundamental Bankruptcy Decisions and replacing them with neutral deci-
sion makers; and (2) establishing a methodology these new decision makers
can employ in deciding whether to reorganize or liquidate the entity.
A. A Revised Debtor in Possession Structure
Chapter 11 currently provides that upon the filing of a bankruptcy peti-
tion, a debtor in possession will be authorized to make both Business Activ-
ity Decisions and Fundamental Bankruptcy Decisions. As this Article has
suggested, vesting the debtor in possession with control over Fundamental
Bankruptcy Decisions often creates indirect bankruptcy costs because the
debtor in possession makes self-interested decisions, such as choosing reor-
ganization over liquidation, despite the impact these choices have on the
entity as a whole.
To solve this dilemma, this Article advocates the creation of a bifurcated
debtor in possession structure-a modified Chapter 1 I -pursuant to which
an appointed trustee and prepetition management share in the decision mak-
ing of the corporation. Under this structure, following an entity's filing of a
petition for Chapter 11 reorganization, the requisite United States Trustee21 5
would appoint an independent trustee to make Fundamental Bankruptcy
Decisions. Such a trustee would be selected from a pool of qualified appli-
cants who were familiar or had experience with the business or industry at
issue, much akin to the way trustees are chosen in a Chapter 7 case. To
reduce the possibility of the United States Trustee merely appointing his or
her "cronies" to the position of trustee, interested parties, such as creditors
and equity-holders, could champion a particular individual on the requisite
panel, although the United States Trustee would retain ultimate decision-
making authority. The fundamental task of the independent trustee would
be to decide if a liquidation or reorganization of the corporation is the
proper course of action. Prepetition management, in turn, would continue
215 Under current law, the United States Trustee's role in a bankruptcy proceeding is
intended to be primarily administrative. The United States Trustee is charged with moni-
toring the proceedings and "prevent[ing] undue delay." 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3)(G) (1988).
To this end, the United States Trustee is appointed to direct Chapter I 1 creditors' com-
mittees, see 11 U.S.C. § 1102 (1988); 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3)(E), and monitor Chapter 11
reorganization plans and disclosure statements; see id. § 586(a)(3)(B).
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to play a role in the reorganization proceedings, but only in the capacity of
making Business Activity Decisions.21
This Proposed Chapter 11 offers many advantages over the existing Chap-
ter 11 structure. First, and perhaps most importantly, it can arguably be
accomplished under the terms of the present statute. 17 Second, it eliminates
management from the role of making Fundamental Bankruptcy Decisions in
recognition that self-interested debtors in possession impose indirect bank-
ruptcy costs and the Bankruptcy Code's restraints on debtor in possession
indiscretions are ineffective. Third, it assigns to both management and the
trustee roles for which they are uniquely suited.218
Management is left to run the debtor's day-to-day business affairs-a posi-
tion for which they are well-equipped. Management has business expertise
and knows the daily activities of the firm, the industry, and the competition.
Also, management is familiar with the various parties involved in the
debtor's affairs, such as its employees and suppliers, and is well-positioned to
negotiate with them. Similarly, the trustee, vested with the authority to
make Fundamental Bankruptcy Decisions, possesses the requisite skills to
make such decisions. The trustee, under the proposed system, unlike man-
agement, does not suffer from the same predisposition to prefer reorganiza-
tion over liquidation. Moreover, trustees would become adept at making
Fundamental Bankruptcy Decisions, as that would be their primary duty.
In some instances, dishonest trustees may prefer to continue with an
attempted reorganization because it offers them the chance to recover larger
fees than they would earn in a liquidation. To curtail this type of behavior,
the United States Trustee or the requisite bankruptcy judge would be vested
with the power to review the trustee's decisions if a party in interest chal-
lenged the wisdom or legitimacy of such decisions. Although such review
might increase the costs of a given bankruptcy proceeding, especially if the
trustee's decisions were challenged often, these costs would likely be more
than offset by the fact that in the vast majority of cases an unbiased trustee
would make prudent Fundamental Bankruptcy Decisions.
The Proposed Chapter 11 structure also restores bankruptcy as a means to
curtail managerial incompetency and imprudent risk-taking. The risk of
bankruptcy should deter poor managerial decision making by assuring that
216 Importantly, this Article contemplates that bankruptcy courts would retain their
ability to replace debtors in possession in their role of business decision maker as well as
fundamental bankruptcy decision maker. Thus, in certain circumstances the debtor in
possession (management) may play no role in debtor decision making.
217 At least one court has adopted this type of arrangement. The court in Chesapeake
B&D Ltd. Partnership v. Communications, Inc. (In Re North Am. Communications,
Inc.), 138 B.R. 175 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1992), for example, appointed a trustee to manage
matters pertaining to the expenditure of the estate's assets while permitting existing man-
agement to continue to run the business's daily business activities. Id. at 179-80.
218 As discussed previously, this specialization of functions is consistent with the eco-
nomic theory of the firm. See supra part II.B.
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managers pay the price for foolhardy decisions. Imprudent managers should
face a loss of reputation or the prospect of present and future employment.21 9
The existing Chapter 11 structure mitigates this bankruptcy risk by allowing
managers to continue in their positions as debtors in possession. The Pro-
posed Chapter 11, however, places a trustee in the position of deciding
whether to reorganize or liquidate, thereby relegitimating bankruptcy risk
and serving to deter management from excessive risk taking.
Several criticisms might be levelled against this bifurcated structure. One
might contend, for example, that contrary to Congress's intent,220 the Pro-
posed Chapter 11 structure will discourage voluntary Chapter 11 filings
because in filing, management faces both an immediate loss of their autono-
mous control over the entity as well as the long-term possibility of losing
their jobs if the trustee decides to liquidate the business. Such an argument,
however, fails to survive scrutiny. The Proposed Chapter 11 does not mean
that managers per se will lose their positions. The trustee might elect to
reorganize the entity, rather than liquidate it. Additionally, this structure
may have the positive effect of inducing managers to perform their jobs par-
ticularly proficiently during the "gap" period between the appointment of a
trustee and the trustee's determination to liquidate or reorganize the com-
pany. As managers may come to believe, stellar performance on their part
may both convince the trustee that the business is viable and that they
deserve a position in the reorganized entity. Empirical evidence also under-
mines the notion that this revised structure would discourage managers from
"voluntarily" choosing Chapter 11. Although managers prefer reorganiza-
tion to liquidation, they nonetheless tend to delay filing any bankruptcy
petition "until liquidation of the business through state remedies is immi-
nent."22 ' Finally, to the extent that many entities that file Chapter 11 more
appropriately should file Chapter 7, this new structure discourages such
misfilings.
A second criticism of the Proposed Chapter 11 structure is that it misallo-
cates decision-making duties. One might assert that a trustee is not well-
suited for the role of making Fundamental Bankruptcy Decisions. Alterna-
tively, one might argue that managers should not be permitted to remain in
control of the daily business affairs of the corporation but should be replaced
in their entire capacity by the trustee.
Both these assertions, however, miss the mark. In the typical bankruptcy
proceeding, four parties are positioned to render Fundamental Bankruptcy
Decisions: (1) management; (2) the interested parties or claimants (creditors
219 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 374-75 (3d ed. 1987); cf.
Irwin Friend & Larry H.P. Lang, An Empirical Test of the Impact of Managerial Self-
Interest on Corporate Capital Structure, 43 J. FIN. 271, 271-72 (1988) (discussing problem
of management's "maintaining a low debt ratio to avoid bankruptcy possibility" even
when increased debt would be in shareholders' interest).
220 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 46, at 231.
221 LoPucki, supra note 146, at 265.
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or equity holders); (3) the bankruptcy judge; and (4) the trustee. Of these
parties, only the trustee is capable of rendering objective decisions with the
requisite level of expertise. Management and the claimants cannot be relied
on to make objective determinations regarding fundamental bankruptcy
questions because of the bias created by the financial and personal stake they
have in the decision rendered. They are likely to choose the option that is in
their own interest despite its effects on the other claimants. Moreover,
although a bankruptcy judge may be capable of making objective determina-
tions, such judges rarely have either the expertise or opportunity to under-
stand a particular business. Making Fundamental Bankruptcy Decisions is
likely to be beyond a bankruptcy judge's technical expertise.222
Likewise, the argument that management should be supplanted com-
pletely by the trustee is problematic. Trustees are ill-prepared and ill-
equipped to make Business Activity Decisions. They are generally not
familiar with either the daily Business Activity Decisions of corporations or
its specific operations. To be able to render knowledgeable and prudent
Business Activity Decisions would require a substantial investment in time
and resources. Undertaking this investment, and its attendant consequences,
such as poor decisions, could increase bankruptcy costs and perhaps offset
much of the reduction in bankruptcy costs saved from taking some of man-
agement's decision-making authority. In contrast, management is familiar
with the daily business activities of the firm, not merely intermittent ones,
and hence well-positioned to make Business Activity Decisions.
B. A Proposed Methodology for Trustee Decision Making
The second prong of the Proposed Chapter 11 structure offers trustees a
methodology to employ in making Fundamental Bankruptcy Decisions.
The basic decision a trustee faces is straightforward: Is the reorganization or
liquidation of the entity the preferable course of action? In other words,
which alternative is in the best interest of the claimants, as well as other
interested parties?
The obvious response to these queries is that the trustee should elect to
reorganize the firm if its reorganization value exceeds its liquidation value.
Or, algebraically, where R is the present value of the future earnings of the
reorganized firm and L is the value of the firm upon liquidation, the trustee
should elect to reorganize the entity if R - L > 0; and liquidate the entity if
R - L < 0. That is, the firm should be reorganized if R > L, and liqui-
dated if L > R.
In microeconomic terms, a successful firm's average revenues will exceed
its average total costs. Average total costs consist of both average variable
costs-costs that vary with the number of products produced-and average
222 This Article recognizes that an examiner might also be placed in the role of funda-
mental bankruptcy decision maker so long as the examiner is drawn from a pool of quali-
fied examiners and is vested with the powers given to the trustee in this Article.
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fixed costs--costs that do not vary with the amount of production or services
provided.223 A firm is in financial difficulty, however, if its average revenues
fail to cover its average total costs. In this situation, a trustee should
attempt reorganization if the entities assets have no readily discernible alter-
native use and the firm's revenues exceed its variable-but not total-
costs. 224 Reorganization is proper, in other words, if the fixed costs of the
entity can be restructured to bring its total costs in line with total revenue.
Likewise, liquidation is the requisite course of action if the firm's revenues
fail to satisfy even its variable costs. Restructuring its corporate debt and
ownership structure will not help the entity in that instance; the company is
not viable.
1. Traditional Approaches-Valuing the Entity
Although the formula the trustee employs in making Fundamental Bank-
ruptcy Decisions is quite simple, the trustee faces a formidable task. The
trustee must determine the firm's respective reorganization (R) and liquida-
tion (L) values. Neither of these values can be calculated with "mathemati-
cal certitude,, 225 but the L value of an entity can be estimated by asking how
much bidders would pay for the assets of the corporation at a liquidation
sale.22 Determining a reorganized entity's R value is more complex. From
an economic perspective, one can find the value of R by projecting how
much income can be derived from the assets of the entity in their projected
use and discount this figure to its present value. Yet, this value may not
accurately capture the complete value of a reorganized entity.
Two competing schools of bankruptcy theory advance widely divergent
views regarding the utility of Chapter 11, and hence indirectly the value of a
reorganized entity. A survey of these two perspectives, the economic and
the value-based accounts, highlights the difficulty in assigning a value to the
reorganized entity. Following this survey, this Article will posit a plausible
solution to determining an entity's reorganization value.
223 The relationship can be illustrated algebraically as follows: Average Total Costs =
Average Variable Costs + Average Fixed Costs.
224 White, supra note 141, at 478 n.3; see POSNER, supra note 219, at 377-78 (sug-
gesting that a firm whose revenues exceed its variable costs ought not to be liquidated);
see also Avinash Dixit, Investment and Hysteresis, 6 J. ECON. PERSP. 107 (1992) (sug-
gesting that it may be sensible to keep a company in business even though its variable
costs exceed its revenues because the chance that operations will improve is equivalent to
an option contract, the value of which can be used to offset interim losses).
225 See Consolodated Rock Prod. Co. v. Dubois, 312 U.S. 510, 526 (1941) (noting that
the company's earning capacity can only be estimated).
226 See Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomans M. Mayer, Valuation in Bankruptcy, 32
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1061, 1063-64 (1985) (outlining the basic distinction between "liquida-
tion" value and "going concern" value). As one might imagine, the simplicity of deter-
mining the liquidation value of an entity is a bit overstated. See id.
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a. The Economic Account
Professors Douglas Baird and Thomas Jackson are the primary propo-
nents of an economic approach to bankruptcy law.227 Inspired by the law
and economics movement, they contend that reduced to its essence, bank-
ruptcy law is simply a response to the problem of collecting debt.22 In their
view, the world is inhabited by economic beings whose actions are both
rational and self-interested. The primary goal for such individuals is to
acquire wealth by engaging in exchanges with others. Because self-interest
drives actors to increase their wealth as much as possible, these actors com-
pete for scarce economic resources.
Although in some situations one actor's acquisition of wealth may not
affect another's, actual conflict will occur when the actors seek to recover
from the same pool of limited resources. A common pool problem results.
In this situation, each actor acting individually seeks to extract as much as
possible from the common pool, hence undermining the interests of the
group of actors as a whole.229
As Baird and Jackson theorize, the purpose of bankruptcy law is to
address this common pool problem by regulating the process by which indi-
viduals make exchanges against a common pool of assets in their efforts to
increase individual wealth. As they assert, in regulating these exchanges,
bankruptcy law seeks to maximize the outcome for creditors by maximizing
the value of the pool. 230 Bankruptcy law accomplishes this goal in two ways.
227 See generally JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMITS, supra note 3 (outlining a theory of
bankruptcy law); Baird, supra note 3 (criticizing Chapter 11 reorganizations); Baird &
Jackson, supra note 12 (developing the theory that bankruptcy law should protect the
interests of the claimants as a group).
The Baird and Jackson approach has engendered much debate: some of it highly
favorable, see, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, A Bankruptcy Machine That Would Go of Itself,
39 STAN. L. REV. 1519, 1520-21 (1987) (praising Jackson's coherent approach to bank-
ruptcy law as set forth in The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law); Robert E. Scott,
Through Bankruptcy with the Creditors'Bargain Heuristic, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 690, 692-
94 (1986) (complimenting Baird and Jackson for "set[ting] the terms of scholarly debate"
in their bankruptcy casebook), some of it very critical, see, e.g., Bowers, supra note 5, at
2103-13 (1990) (criticizing Baird and Jackson's theory of bankruptcy); David G. Carlson,
Philosophy in Bankruptcy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1341 (1987) (reviewing Jackson's The
Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law and stating that all but the most enthusiastic law
and economics adherents "will find the book badly wanting").
228 See JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMITS, supra note 3, at 3 ("Bankruptcy law, at its core,
is debt-collection law.").
229 Id. at 10-19 (describing the nature of the common pool problem and how bank-
ruptcy law works to alleviate it).
20 See Baird & Jackson, supra note 12, at 110 (describing bankruptcy's basic goal as
preserving "the value of assets for those who own them"); Thomas H. Jackson, Avoiding
Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REV. 725, 728 (1984) ("Bankruptcy law is designed to
assure that the asset 'pie' is as large as possible, given a set of relative entitlements.").
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Through the use of the automatic stay,2 3 it prevents individual creditor
actions aimed at the immediate dismemberment of the common pool;232 and
through provisions providing for the distribution of assets subject to certain
requirements233 it provides for a disposition of the pool's assets in a manner
by which the maximum value of the assets is realized, either by a "sale" to
creditors or third parties.2 '
From these assumptions regarding the purpose of bankruptcy law, eco-
nomic account theorists assert that corporate reorganizations can only be
justified if they "permit[ ] the claimants as a group to enjoy a larger asset pie
than otherwise ' '2 1 so as to increase the size of the common pool. Such a
situation occurs, economic account theorists maintain, only when the claim-
ants are willing to pay more for the common pool than third parties. This
situation might theoretically arise in a context where "claimants have better
knowledge about the value of the firm or [where] valuable contributions are
being made to the future well-being of the firm by the various claimants.,
21 6
Yet economic account theorists dismiss the plausibility of such occurrences.
As Jackson argues, if the claimants have information regarding the value of
the firm, it is unlikely that such information would not also be widely avail-
able in the market as well.23 7 Jackson also contends that any special exper-
tise insiders possess does not justify a corporate reorganization because in
either a reorganization or a liquidation of the entity, purchasers will negoti-
ate with insiders in an attempt to encourage them to remain with the firm.238
Economic account theorists view reorganizations as valueless because
reorganizations cannot be justified as pool-maximizing events. Some eco-
nomic account theorists have even gone as far as to suggest that because
empirical evidence supports the proposition that both creditors and stock-
holders lose wealth as a result of a Chapter 11 proceeding, Chapter 11
"should be repealed.,23 9 In summary, economic account theorists believe
that in most situations, an entity's liquidation value should be approximately
equal to its reorganization value. Given the relatively greater costs of reor-
ganizing as compared with liquidating and the slight historical probability of
success, economic account theorists would drastically discount the R value
231 See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
232 See JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMITS, supra note 3, at 151 (describing how the auto-
matic stay prevents behavior that might harm the claimants as a group).
233 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (1988).
234 See JACKSON, LOGIC AND LIMITS, supra note 3, at 210-13 (suggesting that a reor-
ganization is a form of asset sale, the only difference being that in a liquidation, the
common pool is sold to third parties, rather than to the creditors themselves as is the case
in a reorganization).
235 Id. at 215.
236 Id. at 217-18.
237 Id. at 219-20 (doubting that ability of insiders or judges to value a firm more accu-
rately that the market).
238 Id. at 221-22.
239 Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 5, at 1078.
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of a reorganized entity to perhaps .5R or even zero. This discounting effect
is consistent with their favoring liquidation as a remedy and desiring to
repeal Chapter 11.
b. The Value-Based Account
Prominent among critics of the economic account is Professor Elizabeth
Warren. She argues that bankruptcy law reflects many concerns, both
empirical and normative, which cannot be reduced to a single theoretical
construct. In response to the economic account, she offers what she admits
is "a dirty, complex, elastic, interconnected view of bankruptcy from which
[she] can neither predict outcomes nor even necessarily fully articulate all
the factors relevant to a policy decision."24 Under her view, bankruptcy is
"an attempt to reckon with a debtor's multiple defaults and to distribute the
consequences among a number of different actors."24' In distributing these
''consequences," Warren does not view the maximization of creditor wealth
as the predominant concern. Nor does she regard bankruptcy as being about
increasing the size of the creditors' pie. Rather, she maintains, bankruptcy,
and specifically corporate reorganization, is an effort to "acknowledge[ ] the
losses of those who have depended on the business and redistribute[ ] some
of the risk of loss from the default." '24 2 Of particular concern to Warren, is
that Chapter 11 further "the distributional interests of many who are not
technically 'creditors' but who have an interest in a business's continued
existence." 243
Echoing many of the same sentiments as Warren, Professor Korobkin also
objects to the economic account; instead he offers a value-based account.2 44
In Korobkin's view, bankruptcy law is not intended merely as a response to
the problem of collecting debt. Instead, it is an attempt to address the
"moral, political, personal, social, and economic" aspects of financial dis-
tress and the effects such financial distress has on the many parties it
affects.245 Korobkin argues that the fundamental thrust of bankruptcy law is
to provide "a forum for an ongoing debate in which [the] diverse values [of
the participants] can be expressed and sometimes recognized." 246 For him,
bankruptcy "[1]oosely speaking ...accomplishes a kind of " 'group ther-
apy.' ,247 "The value-based account thus explains bankruptcy law as a sys-
tem with varied contours and dimensions, having the distinct function of
240 Warren, supra note 12, at 811.
241 Id. at 777.
242 Id. at 788.
243 Id. at 787.
244 See Korobkin, supra note 12, at 721.
245 Id. at 721.
246 Id.
247 Id. at 722.
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facilitating the expression and recognition of those diverse values important
in dealing with financial distress." '248
Concomitant with the notions that Warren and Korobkin advance is an
unstated belief that the value of a reorganized entity cannot be measured
merely by the present value of its earnings. In their view, the purpose of
corporate reorganization is not simply to maximize creditor wealth, which
would maximize the size of the common pool, but also to further other val-
ues and interests such as those of tort claimants249 or members of the com-
munity.25 Because proponents of this account believe that a reorganized
entity serves important interests apart from those measured in economic
terms, one might expect them greatly to favor reorganization over liquida-
tion. Accordingly, in the equation a trustee faces, one would expect her to
assign a very high value to R-creating a strong presumption that the
trustee will elect reorganization over liquidation.
2. A Process-Based Approach to Valuing the Entity
Both the economic and value-based accounts offer incomplete solutions to
the problem of valuing a reorganized corporation. Most fundamentally,
each account overstates its case. Under the economic account's rationale, a
reorganization would rarely, if ever, occur. By contrast, applying the value-
based account's analysis would mean that a trustee would virtually always
choose reorganization over the competing choice of liquidation. A new
approach that provides principles for determining a realistic value for the
reorganized entity is required. Before developing this approach, this Section
will offer specific criticisms to the use of either the economic or value-based
accounts in valuing reorganized entities.
The economic account's principal failings are that it ignores empirical evi-
dence surrounding Chapter 11 and its legislative history. The economic
view, for example, discounts a study, focusing on cases in the southern dis-
trict of New York, which reported that returns for unsecured creditors from
liquidations were at least ten times lower than returns from Chapter 11
plans.2 ' Thus, the economic account does not adequately address the con-
clusion that reorganizations increase the size of the economic pie.
Economic theorists also ignore the legislative history of Chapter 11 and
the goals Congress intended to foster by its enactment. As the legislative
history of the business reorganization chapter suggests, Chapter 11 was
enacted to further goals apart from the mere enhancement of claimants'
wealth. The legislative history is replete with discussions of developing poli-
cies to "protect the investing public, protect jobs, and help save troubled
248 Id.
249 Id. at 788.
250 Warren, supra note 12, at 788.
251 White, supra note 141, at 484; see STANLEY & GIRTH, supra note 47, at 21-22.
But see Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 5, at 1071-72 (indicating bondholders suffer
significant reductions in wealth attributable to Chapter 11 filings).
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businesses;"252 furthering "overriding community goals and values" in bank-
ruptcy 253 of "the public interest" beyond the interests of the claimants;
25 4
and acknowledging that it is more "economically efficient" to reorganize
than to liquidate. 255 The United States Supreme Court has recognized Con-
gress's consideration of these concerns, stressing the need to interpret the
Bankruptcy Code so as to permit the "successful rehabilitation of
debtors."
25 6
More fundamentally, the adoption of the present Chapter 11 structure and
its operation are indicative of a greater intent by Congress to broaden the
reach, and hence the purpose, of bankruptcy law. The definition of "claim"
was expanded, in "a significant departure from present law, 257 in recogni-
tion that "all legal obligations of the debtor [should] be dealt with in the
bankruptcy case. "258 In decisions subsequent to the enactment of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, moreover, courts have employed the Bankruptcy Code in
addressing a myriad of issues, apart from those of creditor wealth, including
the rights of prospective torts claimants259 and parties to collective bargain-
ing agreements. 8
If the economic account understates the value of corporate reorganization,
the value-based account may well overstate it. Applying the value-based
account to firm valuation, one is left to ask if there is ever a circumstance
where liquidation is preferable to reorganization. Although the value-based
account proclaims the merits of reorganization, it seemingly ignores the pos-
sibility that in a given instance a reorganization may also involve costs that
compel liquidation.
Additionally, although the value-based account underscores the many
252 124 CONG. REC. 32,392 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards); see 123 CONG. REC.
35,444 (1977) (statement of Rep. Rodino) ("For businesses, the bill facilitates organiza-
tion, protecting investments and jobs."); BIENENSTOCK, supra note 122, at 6-10.
253 H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 46, at 53-62.
254 124 CONG. REC. 33,990 (1978) (statement of Sen. De Concini).
255 H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 46, at 220. Unfortunately, or understandably, as
economic account theorists might maintain, Congress failed to articulate the meaning of
"economic efficiency." See Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 5, at 1043 n.4.
256 NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 527 (1984); accord United States v.
Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 203 (1983) (indicating that Congress presumed the
debtor's property to be more valuable in a rehabilitated business).
257 See SEN. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5807.
258 Id. at 5808.
259 See, e.g., In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618, 625 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(noting that the plan must protect the rights of present and future tort claimants).
260 See, e.g., In re Continental Airlines Corp., 38 B.R. 67, 71 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1984).
To be fair, Baird does admit that "victims of manifested torts should have their rights
against the firm recognized in bankruptcy." Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum
Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. CHm. L. REV. 815, 815-17 (1987)
(emphasis added). Of course, under the Bankruptcy Code, these "victims" are creditors.
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concerns that reorganizations might effectively address, such as the preserva-
tion of jobs at a troubled entity, it fails to explain why bankruptcy is the
proper forum to appraise these concerns.26' As Baird acknowledges, "[o]ne
could ... have a federal statute that prevented any business from ceasing
operations" irrespective of bankruptcy. 2 Bankruptcy, and reorganization
in particular, cannot be a forum to cure all of a corporation's or society's ills.
There are limits, and a primary failing of the value-based account is that it
declines to offer any defining formula for a trustee to apply in determining
these limits.2"3
In recognition of the difficulties inherent in both the economic and value-
based accounts, this Article posits a two-step process-based methodology for
valuing a reorganized entity. Under this account, the final value of a reorga-
nized entity, and therefore the decision whether to reorganize or liquidate
the applicable corporation, is not a product of any particular mathematical
formula, but of the Proposed Chapter 11 process and the unique role the
trustee plays in such a process. The trustee's valuation is compelled in a
sense by the process employed.
This process-based account operates in the following manner. A trustee
should be appointed to make Fundamental Bankruptcy Decisions. As noted
above, the principal decision a trustee makes in this context is to decide
whether to reorganize or liquidate the entity. Also, as discussed, this
involves evaluating the firm's worth both as a reorganized or liquidated
entity. To determine the reorganization value under the process-based view,
a trustee should first consider the expected present value of the future earn-
ings of the reorganized entity-the figure denoted as R above. 2" Using this
figure as a benchmark, a trustee should then adjust R upward to reflect the
intrinsic values of reorganization alluded to in the legislative history of the
261 Baird, supra note 260, at 828 (noting that other forums exist to remedy these
concerns).
262 Id.
263 Professor Roe has suggested that a possible approach to determining the value of a
reorganized entity is to float 10% of the shares of the reorganized entity on the market
and then extrapolate the company's value from the sale price for these securities. Mark J.
Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate Reorganization, 83 COLUM. L.
REV. 527, 559 (1983).
This approach, however, suffers from at least four limitations. First, this valuation
would occur after bankruptcy costs were already incurred, and the entity had already
been reorganized. Second, such a solution fails to address the arguments discussed before
regarding the inability of the market to value properly all the benefits of reorganization.
Third, even assuming the market can value perfectly a reorganized entity, issuing a small
float of the entity's reorganized shares might produce an inaccurate figure as some of the
participants in the reorganized entity may have incentives to purchase shares at artificial
prices so as to manipulate the ultimate reorganization value. Finally, this methodology is
only applicable in the case of listed stocks, a relatively small portion of the entities likely
to seek bankruptcy protection. Bebchuk, supra note 5, at 790.
264 See supra notes 225-26 and accompanying text.
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Bankruptcy Code. Values that the trustee should consider include: the
number of jobs the reorganization will preserve; the effects a liquidation or
reorganization may have on the local community; the likelihood of a suc-
cessful reorganization; and the effects the decision will have on creditors,
stockholders, and other interested parties. If the liquidation can effectively
sell the firm as a going concern value, or if there is little going concern value,
the trustee should not significantly adjust R. Obviously, the degree to which
the trustee will adjust R upward cannot be reduced to a mathematical
formula. Rather, the facts and circumstances of each case will shape the
degree of the adjustment. In some instances, the adjustment may be quite
radical, in others quite minimal.
In assessing the adjusted R value, trustees can rely on the process of
adjustment itself to provide guidance. Because trustees will be compelled to
engage in this adjustment process, they will gradually become adept at mak-
ing these evaluations and gain greater expertise. As one might expect, if
trustees become familiar with an industry and are selected as trustees with
respect to that industry, they will develop an ability to make accurate adjust-
ments. Likewise, as the process of making these adjustments develops, a
data pool of information regarding reorganization values will be created for
companies and industries. Trustees might also seek independent assessments
of the reorganized firm's worth compiled by major accounting or manage-
ment consulting firms. This data will prove invaluable to trustees in their
adjustment determinations.
Notably, in attempting to arrive at the proper value for R, the trustee is
engaging in two separate determinations or judgments. First, the trustee is
exercising what might be termed a business judgment about the value of the
reorganized entity. Second, the trustee is making a purely distributive judg-
ment about how much protection one group, the employees, for example,
should receive at the expense of others, such as the creditors. That is, the
trustee is balancing and considering the effects the reorganization will have
on all the parties involved in the process and then determining an adjusted
value for R. In this latter role, the trustee must wear the cap of a judge in
equity, akin to the role initially played by judges in courts of equity with
respect to the railroad reorganizations discussed earlier.265
Following an evaluation of the various concerns and an arrival at an
adjusted figure for the reorganized entity, R, the trustee should compare the
reorganization value to the liquidation value of the firm. If the adjusted
reorganization value is lower, the firm's Chapter 11 reorganization proceed-
ing should be summarily converted into a Chapter 7 liquidation of the entity.
If, however, the firm's adjusted reorganized value exceeds its liquidation
value, then the Chapter 11 proceeding will continue. A reorganization plan
will be developed at which point the interested parties will determine if the
firm's debt and ownership structure can be altered so that the firm can at
265 See supra part I.A.
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least satisfy its average variable costs. If the firm cannot be reorganized so
that its revenues meet its variable costs, the firm should liquidate.
In a real sense, reaching a Fundamental Bankruptcy Decision under the
process-based methodology allows a trustee essentially to employ a modified
form of practical reasoning, well-developed in the field of statutory interpre-
tation.266  Under the practical reasoning model of decision making, the
trustee should consider an array of factors in reaching a decision, from the
broad policies behind Chapter 11, such as preserving jobs, to whether the
particular business at issue is economically viable. In valuing these different
considerations, and hence in formulating a decision, the trustee should weigh
each consideration differently: concrete and narrow considerations should
receive more value than considerations regarding statutory purpose. Thus, if
the business were found not to be economically viable, the decision to liqui-
date would be obvious, despite the purposes of Chapter 11. On the other
hand, if the business were found to be economically viable, then the trustee
should give consideration to the broader purposes behind Chapter 11. The
trustee is essentially exercising some sort of judgment "between the general
standard and the specific case. '  That is, the trustee is deciding, given the
goals of Chapter 11, whether the particular entity before it is one that is a
viable candidate for reorganization.
This process-based account does not eliminate the possibility that a corpo-
ration filing Chapter 11 will ultimately liquidate. Instead, it promises to
reduce bankruptcy costs by vesting an independent trustee with the initial
determination of whether or not the requisite entity is a viable candidate for
reorganization. After this determination is made, the ultimate structure of
the reorganization plan will determine if the firm is economically viable, and
hence whether a successful reorganization is actually possible. The trustee's
role is to speculate about the applicable values of a given entity. Deciding
whether a reorganized entity is economically sustainable pursuant to a reor-
ganization plan is beyond the trustee's province.
Admittedly, the process-based account is not ideal. Trustees will over-
value the reorganized entity in some instances and undervalue it in others.2 8
266 See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation
as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990); Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability
of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism, and the Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REV. 533
(1992); Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV.
1331 (1988); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Practical Reason and the First
Amendment, 34 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1615 (1987). The work of Professors Eskridge and
Frickey served as a model for the form of practical reasoning developed in this Article.
267 See Frank I. Michelman, Forward: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV.
4, 28 (1986) (explaining the application of practical reasoning).
268 To some extent, the likelihood of such overvaluation or undervaluation will be
reduced by the interested parties having an opportunity to "plead their case" to the
trustee. Moreover, the United States Trustee or the requisite bankruptcy judge will
review the trustee's decisions, further reducing the likelihood that political pressure will
compel a trustee to misvalue the firm's prospects.
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This account, however, removes the biased decision maker-management-
from the valuation process. In doing so, moreover, it replaces management
with an independent party who will "grow into" the assigned role of funda-
mental bankruptcy decision maker.
CONCLUSION
Chapter 11 places the management of the enterprise seeking bankruptcy
relief in charge of the debtor business, functioning as the debtor in posses-
sion. In this role, management must make two principal types of decisions:
Business Activity Decisions and Fundamental Bankruptcy Decisions. Busi-
ness Activity Decisions involve choices about the day-to-day affairs of the
business. Fundamental Bankruptcy Decisions, in contrast, are choices
regarding the viability of the entity's reorganization.
A dichotomy of ownership and control exists in the debtor corporation
because the debtor in possession and the residual claimants are separate enti-
ties. This separation of ownership and control produces bankruptcy costs,
the deadweight economic costs to the firm of entering bankruptcy. They
include indirect bankruptcy costs, such as the costs of choosing reorganiza-
tion when liquidation is the preferred alternative.
The Bankruptcy Code attempts to address these costs by imposing several
constraints on the debtor in possession. First, debtors in possession owe
fiduciary duties to the various claimants. Second, the Bankruptcy Code
authorizes the creation of creditors' and equity holders' committees to influ-
ence managerial decision making. Third, interested parties other than the
debtor in possession are permitted to propose reorganization plans. Finally,
debtors in possession can be removed and replaced in certain circumstances.
None of these solutions, however, offer a viable means to eliminate debtor in
possession abuses.
Accordingly, this Article advocates a two-prong solution to the problem
of bankruptcy costs. Under the first prong, a bifurcated debtor in possession
will be created in which the existing management of the entity will continue
in their role of making Business Activity Decisions and an independent
trustee will be appointed to make Fundamental Bankruptcy Decisions. The
appointment of an independent trustee both eliminates self-interested deci-
sion makers from the role of making Fundamental Bankruptcy Decisions
and assigns both management and the new independent trustee roles for
which their skills are uniquely suited.
Under the second prong, the trustee is provided with a methodology for
determining whether to reorganize or liquidate. The trustee first determines
the present value of the future earnings of the reorganized firm (R) and the
liquidation value of the reorganized firm (L). Then, relying on experience,
the trustee adjusts R upward to reflect intrinsic values of the reorganization
recognized by the drafters of the Bankruptcy Code. After making this
adjustment, the trustee considers the respective values and decides whether
to reorganize or liquidate the entity.
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The solution this Article posits is by necessity imperfect. It does not
promise to eliminate bankruptcy costs entirely. Bankruptcies by their nature
are complicated, and hence costly events, described by one jurist as a combi-
nation of "a municipal election, a historical pageant, an anti-vice crusade, a
graduate-school seminar, a judicial proceeding, and a series of horse tracks,
all rolled into one.",269 It does, however, promise to make them less costly-
a step clearly in the right direction.
269 THURMOND ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM 230 (1937).
1993]

